CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPTS

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

PANEL I
AGGRESSION AND MORALE

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R. Benedict
B. Berelson
P. Herring
C.L. Hull
E. Kris
H.D. Lasswell
D. Marquis
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Goldhamer: On the Psychology of Attack Behavior, I don't know whether anyone is repelled by the introduction here of animal subjects. Although human subjects wherever possible are specified, I take it that these experiments probably could not be very well executed in many instances with human subjects.

Mosteller: I think there is some possibility of carrying out experiments like that on human subjects; certainly there have been similar experiments in the past.

Goldhamer: I question whether the use of the term "attack behavior" would have particular relevance for situations other than perhaps battlefield situations. I don't know whether it would be psychologically sound to use the results of such experiments to draw conclusions about civilian participation in the war effort; whether, for instance, the type of frustration that a civilian population might be subject to, or the consequences of such frustration, are going to be uncovered by this type of research.

Mosteller: This type of study will not be relevant to the problems of national willingness to go to war or anything of that sort.

Lasswell: One might formulate a problem of this kind in the following terms: What are the kinds of changes in a situation that are recognized as appropriate for an aggressive response? What are the characteristics of a situation in which certain structures of expectations evoke an aggressive response? Research along this line would involve, I should imagine, a study of persons selected as representative of certain positions of the social structure, and of the range of words and of non-words in a situation that might elicit aggressive behavior. It might serve to stimulate our imagination to think of a way in which we could ask: What are the conditions under which certain expectations are aroused which release an aggressive response on

Lasswell: the part of persons occupying a determinant position in the social structure?

Kris: We might turn from the situation that elicits responses of aggression to the predispositions of the individuals who most effectively resume any desirable behavior after the signal for attack. To the question what kind of people are best used for such behavior, a study of propensity for attack behavior is required. That would enter into a host of personality studies, to supplement those that have already been undertaken. My feeling is that there is available a great mass of material in this direction, and some of it is rather surprising.

Mosteller: Are you suggesting that the orientation of this project toward collecting available data might be useful as a start?

Kris: I would say correlation of available data with new experimental set-ups, in which one surely could use experiments with humans very largely, but in which at least thought should be given to what we can learn from animal behavior.

Lasswell: What Kris emphasized was the relevancy of arriving at a description of the ways in which predispositions are organized at any given time so that such and such changes in a situation would arouse an aggressive response. Now from our point of view I should imagine that experiments on animal psychology would have a minimum of immediate relevancy, but I do see the possible importance of having a continuing series of investigations of methods of eliciting and controlling the most sensitive aggression responses in different community contexts. This would call for an organization of a continuing survey of the distribution of such relationships throughout the world.

Hull: I am inclined to think that the situation is too urgent and the funds too limited to carry out this first project. It might be well to run a series of that type, but it would be very expensive and difficult to establish adequate controls.

Goldhamer: To summarize: The conception of attack behavior indicated in this outline tends to concentrate much more on physical attack as a direct consequence of immediate provocation. Really the problem we are often faced with in thinking about possible military contingencies is enlisting the wholehearted cooperation and aid of the civilian and military population. And to do this we must utilize in whatever way we can whatever rational or non-rational impulses these persons have in order to direct their activity toward goals which might not be adherred to without these motives underlying their behavior.

Marquis: There may be a very good place in animal studies for an investigation of general effects of frustration. Theoretically, understanding of frustration would have relevance to hundreds of human situations besides those of attack.

Speier: There are a number of experimental studies from the last war, particularly with regard to Air Force personnel, on the effect of frustration on breakdown.

Goldhamer: In terms of work that has been done on battle (or close to battle) behavior, this type of study is highly relevant. I am wondering whether, in terms of relative urgency, the primary question nowadays is how to motivate people to aggressive behavior in the physical sense of attack on battlefield. That, I would think, is

Goldhamer: today a relatively minor problem.

Goldhamer: Turning to 1:2a and 1:2b, the disaster implied seems to be physical disaster; in part it could be the type of nervous crisis, let us say, that arises in the situation of rumor emergence. The significant point in 1:2b is not so much to set up a particular investigation as to utilize the techniques for the organization of investigation. The purpose is to exploit real disaster situations that occur in our society, and possibly in other countries as well, and which ordinarily fail to provide us with the lessons we might derive from them. Since this project recommends rather specific organizational techniques -- namely, the appointment of teams of observers who would be spotted about the country ready to dash off to any disaster situation that might develop -- that recommendation, which probably could be executed by the S.S.R.C. or possibly RAND itself, might be very briefly considered.

Benedict: I feel strongly that we would gain a great deal of theoretical understanding if we included also the study of disaster situations in other countries. The comparative material is very striking, and could be of great use. Some of it was found in the bombing surveys and not exploited; some of it is in the studies of Nagasaki; some of it is already available. It is very great contrast material, and would sharpen our own appreciation of the situation.

Lasswell: The excellent suggestion for teams all poised to dash to the scene could be extended readily to situations abroad. I can see many advantages of having our total intelligence processes so organized that we have means on which to rely to go to the scene of any interesting disaster. This is a question of a whole organization of the intelligence function. This suggestion is only to see this mechanism as a possibility for the continuance of alerting personnel for the future.

Goldhamer: The study of leadership in crisis situations might well be a part of any investigation of crises that lend themselves to study. It is certainly a very urgent question as to how one maintains the integrity of crucial personnel like medical personnel, engineers, and others responsible for maintaining minimum facilities during large scale physical disasters.

Berelson: Considerable work must be done beforehand in organizing the kinds of questions to be asked. It ought to be made explicit in this project that a great deal of formulation of the problem needs to be done in preparation. One such area is this whole problem of the characteristics of effective and integrated leadership in such groups. There is a possibility that some work was done along this line during the recent war. There is also a possibility of getting some good questions and hypotheses about such problems by interviewing people who have been through crisis and near-crisis situations, and relating that to the kind of leaders who maintained effective control of the group and those who lost control. This would present good data in itself, and also suggest the kinds of questions that could be asked in the follow-up situation.

Kris: The suggestion is so fascinating, it should be carried out. Studies of persuasion techniques should be included. The project should be a comprehensive study of all aspects of crises by teams. In this project is the idea that in order to get our experimental evidence, we must, as it were, unearth the events which produce a tense situation. There is one tense situation which is rapidly disappearing; I am

Kris: referring to the problems of camp survivors and displaced persons generally. I have no doubt there are many opportunities which have been missed in the last five or six years for integration of social science studies; here we have a rather conspicuous case. Everybody who has had contact with the survivors of camp situations, especially the younger ones, is disposed to describe a number of phenomena as yet ununderstandable, inexplicable, and for which mostly fantastic hypotheses are being brought forward. My hunch is that in another two years these problems will vanish; we will no longer see them clearly structured. We still could by intensive work, especially with juvenile or younger camp survivors, study a large number of problems in various aspects -- namely: How do people react to such bad relations; who is likely to survive; under what conditions is survival better guaranteed; what are likely to be the lasting effects; what happens in total disruption of a large number of social ties; what new ties arise; etc.

Lasswell: It is useful to think of these disaster studies not only from the standpoint of their immediate impact on the persons who are damaged or who fear that they are subject to imminent damage. I think it is important to look at the disaster as a deprivational experience of all who are identified with the situation, of all who respond to it as a disaster to the nation or to any other large scale group of which they are a part. This opens the door for the kind of analysis for which RAND seems to be particularly well set up -- that is, an analysis of the disaster meeting potentials of the society at any given time. This might express itself in a function of provisional quantitative relations between disasters of such and such magnitude and the responses which can be motivated throughout the area of those identified with the deprivation. This links up with the comment that part of the problem is to avoid disorganization of the medical and other services. The problem of having doctors ready, of having radiobroadcasting stations ready for reassurance, and other problems, are amenable to continuous quantitative evaluation in the light of the changing disposition of communities to respond to disasters of various size.

Speier: In any study of crises situations it might be fruitful to distinguish between various types of crises. Many types of crises, of course, can be suggested, but I would like to confine myself to two distinc ions. Your teams would study, I take it, primarily response to crisis situations that have actually occurred. Distinguished from that, and perhaps of equal theoretical and practical importance, are studies of reaction to impending disaster, or threats of disaster, or threats of crisis of various kinds. The results of such studies may lead to very definite policy advantages. For example, if it is decided that it might be useful to make certain social changes (let us say decentralization) in view of the possibility of severe deprivations by bombing in case of war, it would be important for the government to know whether it will get further in its policy of instituting a social change by presenting the coming of a feared or anticipated or possible event as a disaster or not. We may get better cooperation from the effected population by presenting the proposed social changes as measures not so much associated with crisis as they usually are in public discussions.

Speier: On 1:2b1, "The Persuasion Techniques for Crisis Situations", it seems to me it would be an unnecessarily restrictive to undertake the project under this heading; there should not be such a narrow focus. I would venture to guess that in all morale policy measures persuasion itself plays a relatively minor role and that material techniques such as distribution of special advantages to the

Speier: neglected population (e.g., pecuniary or housing advantages) may be more important than persuasion techniques. So I would propose that this project should be part of a larger project called "Techniques in Handling Crisis Situations" in which the more material techniques would be included. ("Non-symbolic techniques" is a doubtful expression because distribution of coffee to a bombed population may provide a primarily symbolic rather than a material advantage.)

Goldhamer: I would make a distinction between two primary types of crises or disasters. We have the acute situation such as, say, Texas City, or any comparable occurrence, and we have a chronic disaster which could be either a continuing threat or a continuing state of disaster. I think some of these projects possibly take on somewhat different characters as they are examined from the standpoint of being studies of acute or of chronic crises. Some of Kris's interests in speaking about the studies that might be made of concentration camp personnel would probably come under the heading of persons subjected to long continuing deprivation -- really chronic crisis persons. This relates to the project on a substitute for fear as a motive for preparedness, which raises the question as to whether an awareness of crisis is useful or not as a means of mobilizing national energy.

Benedict: Before we leave the topic of distinguishing types of crises, there is an important difference in the reaction to the manmade crises and to natural disasters. If this is not true in any culture, this is a very marked thermometer of their particular types of identification -- the reading into natural phenomena of human resentments and attacks on them. I feel very strongly that in these studies one should make a distinction between such crises as are caused by invasion of one's homeland and expectations aroused thereby, from a flood, for instance, which in most cultures is not regarded as a personal human attack. That should be kept in mind in laying out our studies on crises situations.

Goldhamer: That strikes me as raising an important point. On the surface, the Texas City disaster, for instance, seemed like a perfect laboratory situation. The question arises now whether that is really so, except perhaps in terms of learning something about the breakdown of physical resources in the community.

Benedict: It is common in America to regard disasters as personally caused. There are some indications in Red Cross material that that is common even as to the Mississippi floods, which were two generations ago regarded as acts of God. So that would be important not only whenever the system broke down, but whenever they thought that that was the explanation. That's also important.

Herring: I think it's important to establish the difference between ways of approaching this problem in terms of projects such as having teams of people ready to dash out to any disaster, and, what is equally important, and I think prior to that, a consideration of what the team has in mind when it jumps off the fire wagon. There is a great accumulation of reports concerning disasters, and a great accumulation of documents of some relevance from concentration camps, bombings, etc. In terms of priorities, I would be tempted to emphasize that a great deal of preliminary work be done by a systematic survey of existing literature and existing reports. Treating these reports as raw data, we may ask, "What do you find in them?" To be a little more specific, I've been reading with great interest in the newspapers about the difficulties in India, and I must say that I don't find in newspaper

Herring: reports very much that's enlightening as to why people act as they do. The impression you get is that they must be highly unpleasant human beings to behave in this fashion. It seems to me that we must go beyond that and try to clarify more than we have in the past some hypotheses which would give us a general conceptual scheme in which these could be placed. A critical appraisal of this literature of disaster would, I think, fill a Bible. It might enable us to see what it is that attracts the attention of reporters, what are the things reported and what are the things unreported. Or there are certain relevant questions that could be suggested. While one could imagine teams that are properly orientated as to what to look for collecting data, one might also imagine that a formulation of this problem in terms of more significant factors might, in fact, have some effect on the nature of newspaper reporting. There might be more adequate coverage, so there would be a generally better understanding of what this is all about. My point is, in sum, that we stand very much in need of a clarification of the hypotheses. We stand in need of a critical appraisal of existing literature, and perhaps that of a long record of disasters we have at hand. We should get much further than if our emphasis were primarily upon sending men out to observe fresh disasters. There is a great deal to be learned from what has already been accumulated on the subject.

Lasswell: I think that it is valuable to emphasize that the people who are on the spot for the observation of developing events should be equipped with a comprehensive conceptual structure. That is one of the unspoken assumptions which we are making here, that the people who carry on these projects would be equipped with an adequate psychological and sociological conceptual structure. It is worthwhile to emphasize that repeatedly. I believe that the investigation of past disaster responses is likely to have rather a minimum of significance in preparation of fruitful inquiry -- not only because of the data called for by a rigorously systematized body of psychological and social theory (in approaching such investigations, the data are usually inadequate), but also because there is a great advantage in organizing our work with a view to providing us with knowledge of how reactions are changing throughout the world area whose future policy we are trying to influence. One of the advantages of the investigation of the unfolding disaster situation is, for example, that we would be able to explore what it was that people felt was being damaged or threatened about themselves. Is it themselves in their capacity as non-Communists? For instance, one of the most significant questions one would like to have had answered about the Texas disaster was the frequency with which the rumors spread, both in Texas City and in varied degrees from it, that this was part of some sinister Communist conspiracy. That is, these disasters give us an interesting opportunity to investigate the personality structure of people occupying such and such positions in the culture, and such positions in the geographical organization of populations around the world. This is an additional reason for a continuing trend survey of how the tensions on people in time and space are changing. I feel, therefore, that it is valuable to put the emphasis upon preparedness for the investigation of the unfolding future.

Kris: Three types of disasters to be studied have been suggested -- past, occurring, and impending. It seems to me that precedence is to be given to the occurring ones because we learn most as observers. But I should like to point out that some of the projects suggested to this panel in fact deal with impending disaster -- e.g., the emotional impact of atomic bombing (1:2e). From some data which have come to my attention it has seemed to me for some time that there has not yet been clarified

Kris: the general problem of under what conditions what kind of threat is reacted to in what way by whom. This is pretty generally a problem which we ought to investigate. To an unusually great disaster threat there is a resistance, a skepticism as to the reality and possibility of disaster, a sort of collective method of not wanting to believe in it. We might speak of a "denial reaction" to anything connected with the event, to even focussing attention on the possibility of atomic disaster. There I have the conviction that one has to investigate the media of communication, and the relevant differences between the nations of the world. I understand that in some areas, at least, the thought is flatly rejected. I am exaggerating that somewhat because I believe that a survey of the continuance of reaction to impending disaster should be taken into account; this would attach to the disaster project 1:2e.

Goldhamer: That raises the difficult question as to how one compounds conflicting instrumentalities. It might be one could readily conceive circumstances in which it would be desirable, let us say, for the population to be more apprehensive then it is at a given moment. On the other hand, for other policy purposes it may be highly desirable to take measures that would inoculate the population against the possibility of becoming apprehensive. I was wondering, since we do have a project that raises directly the question of a substitute for fear as a motive for preparedness, how we can resolve that particular difficulty. I take it that this suggestion is written from the standpoint of one who suspects that fear is a rather inadequate motive and should be minimized as much as possible. On the other hand, one does hear statements very frequently made that one difficulty in the United States today is that people aren't sufficiently afraid of really what might be in store in the future. One could argue certainly that fear is demoralizing, and yet there are these other considerations.

Kris: The question when fear is a valuable incentive and when substitutes are better incentives is independent of the question which I tried to raise, namely, that the policy-maker, before he makes a decision as to fear or substitute incentives, or counter-measures to fear, should know what is the potential disaster-threat resistance within the population. This would be an intelligence function. It would establish an attitude, and the policy-maker would decide in what direction this attitude should be modified or reinforced.

Goldhamer: Suppose a question is raised about a certain apathy in the population which one wants to overcome, and the suggestion is made that more emphasis on the consequences of atomic and biological warfare would secure greater preparedness on the part of population, or at least greater support for current measures. How does one handle the possibility that such a motive for preparedness might predispose the population, if and when disaster occurs, to react in a more disorganized fashion to it? Because part, presumably, of the fear campaign would be to emphasize the rather disasterous effects of any type of military undertaking. I'm not quite clear as to what type of investigation or analysis one could make to determine how far one should go in one direction without incurring the danger that arises in the other.

Marquis: Our problem is that when disaster comes it's going to come in the form of bombing or sabotage, and the question we really want to know is what are the most effective measures of protection and control. Your question then becomes a subquery: Would a fear motivation allow for optimal control of such contingencies?

Marquis: I don't know the answer either, but I think we ought to direct our attention to the crucial question, which is the methods of control. If we could anticipate disasters -- for example, hurricanes in Florida cities, or floods along the Mississippi, or the depression -- could we, through experimental controls, established differentially in different communities, observe differential effects? In one community we could try to create a strong fear of the depression; in another community, emphasize something else, some kind of constructive measures; and so on. Then we could see what the results of different methods of preparation are, either when a depression comes (if it does come), or what anticipatory controls are established and what apparent effectiveness they have. What I am seeking is some kind of experimental situation in which we can try out different control methods. What type of community organization will be the most effective control against physical disaster? And so on.

Mosteller: Nobody likes the experimental approach better than I do. But I am very much afraid that it would be extremely difficult to get anything like experimental situations and experimental controls of that sort you describe. Because, even if you begin to get something that looks significant, however carefully matched the communities may be, you would need a great number of replications to have any confidence at all in the results. And I'm afraid it would be so expensive, as it is so difficult to spread propaganda in the first place about something that people may not be particularly interested in. I feel there are almost insuperable difficulties in doing the particular kind of thing suggested.

Benedict: Some substitute might be found in comparing different areas of the United States. We know a good deal, something at least, about differences in reactions which occur in southern communities as against the northwest states. That would not come down to the study of what persuasion is needed, what propaganda we can use, but to certain differences in the experiences and character structure of people in these different areas of the United States, which would greatly be extended if we carried out such studies in other countries. It seems to me that is a useful substitute for experimentally setting up the conditions.

Hull: I might suggest a remedy for the difficulty. You have a kind of microcosm in certain instances where you have people confined to conditions that can be restricted rather completely; they are relatively small in scale, and the study can be carried out with a minimum of expense as compared to trying to propagandize the whole state, for example. I think homes for relatively normal children would be one, homes for the aged another. What we would want are middle-aged people or young people, and those are not in institutions; but one can often get relatively easily, quickly, and cheaply the general tendency of what would happen by working with children, and there are a good many children in help-given homes.

Goldhamer: On Project 1:2a, "Public Apprehension of Threats to Physical Security," I suppose the intent of some such continuing index is to provide us with knowledge about the differential response of different parts of the population to threats to physical security; and there probably would be an opportunity, if carefully made studies were executed, to determine not only an index charted through time, but also to trace movements of the index for different types of events. We might thereby be able to discover that certain parts of the population are sensitive to some types of threats, and other parts are relatively insensitive to these. This particular suggestion would require the utilization of one of the existing polling agencies

Goldhamer: or else the creation of something comparable to it. This project would probably involve considerable expenditure of time and money, partly because it is a continuing project. If the study is to be carried out at all, it ought to be introduced at the earliest possible moment, because what we require is something in the way of a baseline from which we can measure the effect of whatever future events occur. For instance, if there is a demonstration of an atomic bomb by another nation, and at that time we begin to wonder whether it had any effect on the American population, we will really be at a loss because we won't have anything to compare responses with. The suggestion itself doesn't seem to be a fruitful one.

Mosteller: One of the big questions for our whole panel in connection with this study, and with some others, is the problem of the measurement of morale itself. Social scientists as a whole have fallen down pretty badly on the job of construction of indicies of morale. I can not point my finger at any index of morale constructed by anybody (including myself) that I really feel is anything I'd care to base any further judgments on. Now, if you don't have any way to measure morale then the question of a continuing index of morale is superseded. Is there really any hope for learning how to measure morale, or must we break morale down into very, very fine specific categories and say, morale in reference to this, morale in reference to food, moral in reference to something else, and so on?

Lasswell: Some of the dissatisfaction with many of the so-called morale studies comes from the difficulty of distinguishing the personality structures of the persons that are being described. Many times people talk about morale in such and such an area as being low, and one has a minimum of differentiation with respect to the structure of the personalities of the people involved. One doesn't have a clear sense of what demands the self makes on itself, what demands are made on other people, and what expectations are with respect to a range of pertinent contingencies for the future. Without a comprehensive investigation of the organization of the self of the person reacting to the situation, one is bound to have rather unsatisfactory characterizations of response potential. I imagine that most of us use terms like 'morale' as a short-cut way of talking about the forecast of a potential response, if something happens that we are interested in, in the environment of the persons being described. What people are talking about under the term 'morale' is something like this: People are asking for an estimate of the potential response that certain persons are going to make in a variety of situations which are anticipated to be of some consequence. This raises the very old question of how we can arrange situations at any given time so as to call out a representative response. Can we be sufficiently ingenious at any given time in mentioning in advance the sequence of environments to which the group will be exposed, so as to allow our description of any cross-section of its reaction potential to be of some value to us?

Lasswell: If we have an arrangement set up for continuing survey of a situation, there is a place for studies of varying degrees of rigor in the characterization of these responses. A good example of the type of study which I think is very fruitful would be a study of the effects on the reaction potential of the various measures of control referred to by Marquis sometime back. Investigations such as whether you get some of the results you want by turning a hose on a crowd at an early stage when it mills around, or whether you wait until the crowd is actually starting a mob action before you use the hose--problems of that kind can, as a matter of fact,

Lasswell: be explored to some extent from the history of the past police measures in the use of hoses to quell riots. I cite that as an example of the literally dozens of interventions in a situation which have been tried in different contexts. It is my forecast that what we will find is that we can by altertness keep more or less up to date on control measures which have had some degree of apparent success in a given situation, but that the main effect of that knowledge will be to stimulate the imagination of advisors of the policy makers to take into full account whatever seem to be the distinctive opportunities in the situations that confront him for action. In short, there are an almost infinitely large number of devices of intervention that one might invent and use in a concrete situation. And one of the major functions of studies of past situations is to stimulate the imagination of the policy-advisor to inventing, in the light of some of these past experiences, ways of intervening in the particular sort of context that confronts him, so as to make it likely that the desired response will occur.

Goldhamer: As to how such polling procedure might be executed, one would want to utilize questions or stimuli for the respondents that would not reveal the intent of the question. In general, I would be very skeptical about any type of apprehension indexes based on a question such as "Are you afraid of this or that?" I wonder if it wouldn't be possible to use even such simple devices as asking on these polls rather simple questions as to whether the individual would prefer to live, let's say in a large city, a small town, or out in the open country. The point would be to maintain a continuous count of percent of persons who not only indicate a preference for open country dwelling, but who also, in response to the question "why", will specify as one reason the fact that it would be much safer to live there in the event of war. I could quite readily conceive, if international tension mounts to a rather high pitch, that that type of thing might actually come out in rather clear form in such an index.

Benedict: All these questions under this project should be phrased in terms of what people would be willing to pay, in terms of taxes, dispersion of population, etc. This would provide a real index of what you can rely on.

Berelson: Although there are great difficulties in the project, it might conceivably be carried out. One might try to design the study so that one could chart the trend line of apprehension and still do some more intensive study, through a series of cross sections as to why changes actually occur. One could do that by setting up, for example, a rotating panel for interviewing, having four-fifths of it remaining the same from time to time with a new fifth in each case; then any changes from time to time can be explored in some detail whenever that becomes desirable.

Berelson: When we were talking about the general study of crisis and disaster situations, we tended always to talk about a Texas City kind of situation, because that's dramatic, and so on. But in reference to such problems as dispersal, one can do a good deal of studying now, for example on the most appropriate forms of organization in these communities to attain specified ends. Some work has already been started in this connection through the study of large-scale new communities which are not satisfying all the conditions of what a community of some dispersal might be, but which still provide useful information.

Lasswell: This type of survey is only useful if one has a minimum of two methods

Lasswell: of observing the same situation. It's quite possible to describe the structure of expectation on the basis of relatively brief, casual procedures; it's possible to investigate the same structure of expectation by more intensive procedures. If a continuing survey of this kind is conducted, we should make sure that at least two concurrent methods of different degrees of intensity are used to describe the same structure of expectation. I make this suggestion partly because it seems to me that this will greatly increase the possibility of critically evaluating the results through time, especially of validating the forecasts made on the basis of such descriptions. Theoretically, one could get dependable calibrations of these two ways of describing the same situation, so that the problem of its interpretation would be simplified.

Mosteller: Not only would we like to get two ways of measuring things, but I think, too, it would be nice to remember to measure the same things the same way more than once.

Mosteller: We have spoken about how much people are willing to pay, and I have some rather dismal experiences on trying to find out how much people are willing to pay for anything in several different connections: one in connection with consumer goods, and one in connection with theoretical classification of the value of money. Both of these have been very sad tales. Not only should we worry about what they are willing to pay, but in the same connection we might spend a little thought on how much *we* are willing to pay to get the information available. I am not at all worried about the public opinion polls aspect of this; what I am worrying about is our own difficulties in supplying the public opinion polls people with ways of going about getting the information we want. We must put the emphasis on teaching ourselves what to do rather than on teaching them. So far as we know, if we can explain it to them, they will respond. The cost of this survey on physical security, if we want to learn how to predict, must be emphasized. And what we want to predict is going to have to be made pretty clear. Consequently, I think a good deal of the money to be allocated to this project should be shunted off in the direction of a series of investigations of how to predict responses from something like morale. The cost would be very small compared to the cost of the "Crisis and Disaster Situations" project, which would require, say, nine teams with five people on a team.

Goldhamer: The intention was not to have fulltime personnel, but to use psychologists employed full time elsewhere who would be released from their obligations to dash off to a disaster situation.

Mosteller: That won't work because those people have to analyze the data. That is a big mistake that we often make ---- spending months getting data and then merely days analyzing it. The people who have been out there have got to take the responsibility of analyzing the data. They were taught how to collect it and they have to be taught how to analyze it. It would be a full time job.

Goldhamer: It would be a very happy situation for us if we were in a position to predict the changes in an apprehension index, but I think that failing success in that it would still be an extremely valuable addition to our knowledge at any given time to know *post facto* what the changes are. As long as the *post* isn't too far back we can keep track of changes in apprehension level even if our knowledge is not adequate to anticipate those changes or to account for the sources of change. Don't

Goldhamer: you think the various measures that might need to be undertaken to counteract insecurity in the civilian population can be undertaken simply on the basis of the rather crude knowledge of how, in fact, the index is moving, quite apart from its predictive capacity?

Lasswell: Is it appropriate to think very seriously of how to set up pre-test situations? We can take the selected group through a sequence of experiences which comes as close as possible to our best judgment of the way in which this group of persons will move from where they are now to the future situation that we want to forecast. To be a little fantastic for the moment, it is quite possible for political scientists and economists, if they are carefully cross-examined over a long period of time, to come to some agreement as to the way in which certain fluctuations in the price changes are going to affect a person of such and such a position in the production process. By the interplay of questions and answers between psychologist and economist, I suggest that it's possible to clarify the way in which a price fluctuation is going to enter into the daily life situation of the persons of the sort whose response you're interested in exploring. We might get together the relevant experts and select the more probable sequences of experience to which selected groups may be exposed. Then we could devise an experimental procedure which would in the pre-test situation reveal the potential response to the future situation in which we are interested. This might involve exposing the person in a series of situations to selected movies, still pictures, etc. -- there are dozens of possibilities one can imagine. Now, is this the kind of anticipation of plausible lines of future development that might enable us to discover the pertinent reaction potentials of a given group?

Mosteller: It certainly seems to me that this is one way we might start.

Hull: This procedure without adequate controls would mean almost nothing. I understand your idea was to find out what the condition is before the test, and to check the impact of whatever stimuli occur by observing changes in stimuli, then testing the same people afterwards to see if there is another change in response. That would be likely to yield something which I think many of these studies cannot yield. It might easily yield something in the way of principles which would enable you to cope with a more or less changed situation. If you knew the principle and something about the strength of the stimuli and their combination, you'd have a chance to make a valid prediction about the crisis to come.

Goldhamer: Projects 1:2e and 1:3 have this is common, that they turn our attention from the problem of measuring apprehension or morale to the problem of manipulating it. In the original formulation 1:2e referred to the fact that studies of the consequences of anticipation of atomic bombing presumably cannot be made now, on the basis at least of the two historical recorded accounts we have of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But those two cities might presumably be studied from the standpoint of what the after-consequences are. The assumption underlying the study is this: if one could show that persons in Hiroshima who were present at the time of the attack still show fairly marked psychological characteristics that differ from persons of towns not subject to atomic bombing, even if those differences are not too great, the implication would be that persumably at an earlier period, that is immediately after the attack, the consequences were perhaps even more intense. In any case, a study of the late stage of crisis response would offer some material as to the possible psychological consequences of an atomic bomb attack. This might be done,

Goldhamer: for instance, by subjecting people to startle stimuli or to various tension-producing tasks (of which mirror drawing is often more adequate than might seem). I wonder whether this seems a little too out-of-the-way, whether we can hope from such studies at this stage to learn very much about the psychological consequences of being subjected to atomic bombing.

Mrs. Benedict: Any such study should also include control studies of other Japanese. I doubt whether that study would be directly applicable to American situations, because of the difference in the total character structure of the Japanese and Americans. If it were compared with Japanese controls, it might be of some interest for American planning. But we must be very careful to make clear in the set-up of the project that it is not to be directly applied to expectations among the American people.

Goldhamer: Although the project would have certain defensive implications, its intent is largely with respect to the effect of bombing on populations which might be potential enemies. That would still involve some extrapolation from Japanese to other peoples, and I suppose that warning would still be needed there.

Mrs. Benedict: I don't think you can apply what you find among the Japanese to Germany.

Hull: One could apply the same test to the Germans and the English, who have also been bombed, even though not in the same way.

Goldhamer: There is this difference. The point of this study would be to determine whether a single attack of the proportions of the atomic attack has some particular effect. The study of the Germans, who were subjected to continual bombing, would also be valuable, but it wouldn't tell you very much about psychological consequences from a single attack.

Marquis: Unfortunately, the difficulty with the atomic bomb study is that most of the people who came into contact with the situation are no longer available for study.

Hull: The significant fact here is the differential nervous sensitivity, whether it is Hiroshima or Texas City or a disaster on one of New York's subways. We ought not to put too much emphasis on the atomic bomb. We want to make quite a number of studies of many situations to see what the character of differential nervous sensitivity is, but I am not particularly impressed by the selection of these two cities. We want to know what effect this shock of the mind would have on something else. We want to be able to predict something or other. The question arises how long after the bomb has been exploded would you be able to predict anything?

Goldhamer: What most of our remarks are leading to is that the framework here seems to be unduly narrow. Would it make more sense to say that we would be interested in the extent to which the atomic bomb provides an incapacitation of the population in addition to the purely physical disorganizing features that it might have. Nervous sensitivity is simply the form in which that might be manifested at this late stage. The intention is probably to infer from the continuing impact discoverable two years afterwards what its psychologically incapacitating effect may have been. Decisions as to the distribution and number of A-bomb attacks might certainly be based, not simply on physical damage to be achieved, but also on creating an incapacity on the part of

Goldhamer: the population, or a will to surrender.

Speier: When one talks about the emotional impact of atomic bombing, the thing that comes first to my mind is the emotional impact upon the bomber -- that is, upon the home population. The news of an atomic bombing attack on an enemy will have to be released at home. It may create such fears of retaliation and may have such severe repercussions on the home morale, that it may be of great interest to any policy maker to know a little more about possible reactions at home to such a type of warfare. This is a question which is susceptible to easier exploration than the one proposed here.

Benedict: It seems to me also that there is a great field for international exploration of this. I remember speaking just after the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima to a group of Chinese who discussed the atomic bomb. The size of it didn't matter at all to them; it was the difference between using a weapon directly against a man, and dropping it from the skies. This has a great basis in Chinese thought. There are other aspects of that to explore internationally: whether it is the personal contact that really matters to the bomber or whether size of destruction. To America it is size, very strongly.

Lasswell: We should consider not only the effect on the home population, but also the effect on the "neutrals", in the sense of those who do not feel themselves involved with responsibility for immediate participation in what is going on. That may be of very great consequence in some future situations. I would like to see explorations of how various people around the world would respond to the use of different kinds of weapons in the future.

Speier: We may have to face situations in which the use of certain weapons may lead to a change in the moral characteristics assigned to the war when it breaks out. That is, through the application of certain weapons, the distribution of right and wrong -- as it is seen at home, in neutral countries, in enemy countries, and particularly among minorities sympathizing with the American cause -- may be completely reversed by the application of weapons to which certain moral values are attached.

Goldhamer: Concerning the effect of other weapons that might be used in the future, we might include in our discussion Project 1:3 on the Psychological Effect of a Reconnaissance Satellite. Assuming that you have a visible satellite which flashes by every hour, what uses could it be presumed to have in terms of its psychological impact, quite apart from reconnaissance purposes? Would these effects, as a matter of fact, counteract its reconnaissance value? The research method suggested is an ingenuous solicitation of opinions from experts. I wonder whether that is our last resort.

Hull: One means would be to spread propaganda that the device will actually be put into operation. That would be much more realistic than asking any expert what he thinks. I doubt whether there is any expert who would have realistic notions of what would happen in the absence of any general principles bearing on it.

Goldhamer: Of course, once one launches the satellite, if you don't like the results it may be too late to recall it.

Hull: You can carry on false propaganda (if one is sensitive about such things, to a limited population only) and see what effect the belief has upon them. The belief would be practically the same thing as the reality, because after all the reality of this thing would be largely symbolic, since it is not expected to bomb, but only to get information.

Goldhamer: The only difference, as far as I know, between the actual satellite and what one could accomplish by merely telling limited populations that it is spinning around, is that it might be visible, and that might have some additional impact.

Benedict: One has to consider also the effect of disseminating false propaganda.

Marquis: There are three possible effects: the domestic, the potential enemies, and the potential neutrals whose involvement we wish to increase. Part of a general program of study is the effect on potential enemies of the use of threats or appearance of omnipotence. Another part is what technique would be most effective in securing the maximal involvement of neutral countries. This is not a very good problem for the study, because it is so far outside the realm of ordinary experience that it is hard for people to predict how they would react to it. That comes back to an earlier point, that predictions in morale studies are good if you are very familiar with the circumstances. People can tell you how much they'll save next year, whether they'll buy a car, whether they want to have a baby, but I doubt if they could tell you with any great reliability what they would feel if they saw this satellite.

Goldhamer: Assume a situation in which people are faced with a decision whether to launch such a satellite or not, and that they are aware of its physical or reconnaissance performance, but ask what its other effects would be. Is there any procedure we can set up for providing such persons with at least our best opinion? I wonder whether we shouldn't go back to Hull's suggestion which really does seem feasible: one could disseminate propaganda (which might backfire, of course) and really see what effect the belief has on at least limited populations.

Marquis: The other way would be to try to get some general principles out of the study of past threats, and of the effect a real show of power has on a potential enemy, and potential neutral countries. There are many ways of studying that in past experience, as well as in others that can be arranged now, such as naval demonstrations, Bikini tests, etc., which would be more relevant than this fanciful one for answering the specific question posed.

Mosteller: The general idea of studying basic problems is worthwhile. We could go and study what people thought about flying saucers, for example; that's pretty close to the idea. But we can dispose of the problem on a fairly realistic basis. This gadget, first of all, won't do what the assumptions say it will, even in ten years time. You will not be reporting activities within every square mile of the earth's surface. However, this gadget will be extremely useful in meteorological work, so useful that it's very unlikely that any psychological or political implications will have any effect on decisions whether to launch it. Besides, even if you don't put yours up, the other fellow will. Furthermore, it seems to me that by the time it is launched, the other fellow will be in a position to knock it down, if he doesn't like it. I conclude it is not worth discussing.

Herring: The meaningful factors of this problem are all eliminated. Psychological effect would be a part of the general context in which this occurred, and we know nothing of the international situation of the time, we know nothing of the circumstances which would give meaning to the whole situation.

Goldhamer: Of course, one would want to provide the statements about psychological effects in terms of various contingencies or situations existing at the time the satellite is launched. The question is not whether it is useful for meteorological information, but whether that is its only use, whether one should release information that implies or states that it is useful for many other things in addition. The question is what effects can be achieved by such a gadget, provided you take certain information or propaganda steps at the same time.

Lasswell: Isn't this a good example of the wisdom of recommending a continuing program for appraising the possible consequences of any action throughout the range of groups to be effected? Such a procedure would call for a careful examination of claims made by engineers, for example, about the effective consequences of introducing any gadget at any time stage. I make this only as a general remark because I favor the general views that have been expressed about this detail.

Lasswell: Considering the general question of the relationship between psychological knowledge and the inhibition or stimulation of aggression, one of the basic points to make is the need of maintaining a continuing audit of the aggression potentials of people occupying determinant positions in the social structure around the world. Part of this investigation would include an examination of what people recognize as an occasion for a guilt response that inhibits their externalized aggressions, or that releases them. For different groups in society at any given time, what are the forms of language, the forms of acts performed by others, that elicit a guilt response in the personality structure which either is internalized or externalized? That is one of the general questions that is pertinent for exploration from the standpoint of the management of the peoples' responses. Another closely related topic is: What are the ways by which you maintain uncertain expectations about your own power? In the future there will be many opportunities to try to inhibit aggression by so handling the situation as to maintain uncertainty as to whether you can get away with it or not if you externalize some aggressive act. I would like to know what the structure is of those expectations; I would like also to know what kind of deprivations are accepted by the person as what he deserves in the guilty situation. Since the self may be viewed as composed of several different structures, one of the problems is under what circumstances you change the structure of the self, that is to say, the area of effective identification. Suppose you want to change people from identification with the USSR or with a national or religious group; what are the ways you can move them from identification with that large group back to an identification with their families and then their own primary egos? In any given situation we need to have on tap a number of reaction potentials by which we can change the people from their broad identifications back to their lesser identifications. There is also the question how we can move them out again to enlarge the self, that is, the processes of involvement. Furthermore, what are the kinds of demands on the self and others which are pertinent to this problem of aggression? The general question is how we can systematically set up a procedure which will keep us instructed as to the reaction potentials of people of importance to us, so that we can consider the ways by which we can change the structure of their self, the nature

Lasswell: of their demands, and the form of their expectations.

Benedict: I am impressed with the differences of the kinds of character structure in the different nations we are dealing with. One interesting difference is the effect of their experiences and conditioning by laws and customs on the extent, whether maximum or minimum, to which they use their strength. Some nations habitually use their strength at a much lower level then others, even nations of western civilization, to say nothing of the eastern. Such studies as these have to be carried out with primary reference to the over-all learning processes which are habitual in different parts of the world. It would sharpen our knowledge of America very much to have comparative material on this. It is a basic problem in morale, as I would appraise it, this matter of strength and weakness -- how to use them, to what degree, and in what situations. I believe that they can be studied, but with very close examination of ways of life -- for instance, the response to the father which is experienced in the family and then applied to the state. That is a great field which is basic to morale and to estimates of differential morale in the various nations we are interested in.

Speier: While experimental morale studies are of great importance, we should not overlook that the knowledge gained from peacetime situations, let's say Texas City, is not necessarily applicable to morale situations in war time. The situations may not be analogous. On the other hand, we do have from the last war data about morale policies that actually occurred in war time; that situation more closely approximates the possible deprivations to be expected in the case of a future war than is true in the case of Texas City. Therefore I would like to put in a rather strong word for the usefulness of bringing theoretical knowledge to bear on the reexamination of the data in the whole field of morale of countries like England, Japan, Germany, and also from an examination of the morale policies defined by the respective governments.

Benedict: One of the things one has to put in the foreground, from this point of view, in regard to any country is the dichotomy they make between peace and war. There are a great many different motivations, a great many different goals, which are set in America in peace and in war. Our enormous difference between peace and war is greater than you would find generally in the world.

Hull: I would like to make one general observation here, on the absence of general principles which is so characteristically different from what you get in physical sciences. Lasswell is the only person, I recall, who has mentioned the general principles, and I think he would be the first to agree that those general principles are not stable as yet in the form of any laws, such as the equations of physical science. I submit that in the physical sciences, possession of those laws does enable them to predict in a relatively precise manner future situations, which are more or less unique because every future situation is always unique -- there is a different combination. Nobody can tell, unless you know the general principles involved, what the outcome will be, but if you do know the principles it is possible to make much more precise predictions. The difficulty of that approach is, of course, that it takes time.

Goldhamer: I don't know whether the distinction between what you might call empirical generalizations and rational laws is worth making here. I suspect that

Goldhamer: what would happen is that in some instances, because of the urgency of the matters under consideration, one would be content with empirically derived laws for which there exists relatively little rationale but which provide some possibility of anticipating the future. Of course, when the laws are on such a tenuous basis, presumably you can go very far wrong in many instances. But the creation of rational sets of laws is not by any means excluded because of expediency.

PANEL I

MORALE AND AGGRESSION

SECOND MEETING

(Jointly with Panel 2)

H. Goldhamer (Chairman)

R. Benedict
B. Berelson
D. Marquis
F. Mosteller
S. Stouffer

Mosteller: I would like to see included in 1:2b (Crisis and Disaster Studies) one remark about the possibility of studying rapid therapy methods for people who have been subject to psychological shock of various kinds, pathological grief, etc.

Goldhamer: On Project 1:2c, "Appraisal of Morale Policies in Wartime", the view was negative, with the proviso that if the more important lessons from morale policies in the past war are not adequately assembled someplace (and the assumption was that they were) that it might then be worthwhile undertaking.

Marquis: I have been told that the morale parts in the bombing survey are not going to be studied or analyzed any further, which means they won't be put together with anything else. They are merely the report of the studies.

Goldhamer: We might suggest then the desirability of at least some survey as to how adequately exploited the materials are and then have a decision reached on the basis of that survey.

Mosteller: With respect to the bombing survey itself (I don't know about the morale study that was carried along with it), I think there is very serious question whether the data that was gotten really had adequate analysis. I would like to raise the question whether the morale part in turn had adequate analysis. It would be worthwhile - this seems a natural thing for RAND to do -- to reinvestigate a big survey like that, that cost so much money and manpower, to see whether there's anything to be gotten out of it that wasn't gotten out of it the first time, or indeed, whether anything that was gotten out the first time was right.

Benedict: Then I feel that the utility of the results should certainly be revised.

Benedict: The study of the morale situation under bombing in Germany, Britain and Japan is said here to provide guidance in improving U.S. morale and disrupting enemy morale in general. Such utility of any of the raw material, without pinning it to the situation in the specific country, is very doubtful.

Marquis: I have also been told that there are large sections of the material which have not even been analyzed because the teams were disbanded. For the Japanese data there was also a lot of dissension in the group; the anthropologists in the group, for example, got in a big battle with the opinion pollers, and I never heard how some of those rather interesting and involved controversies were resolved. This does suggest that there is probably a lot of material that has not been exploited.

Goldhamer: The comments that we have here on this project indicate now a somewhat higher level of enthusiasm for the potential significance that the project might have than the comments in the summary of Panel 1 did. I think from the comments that have been made about it that I will shift my own position too.

Stouffer: There is one sentence that might be added about this project. In several other panels it was pointed out that areas of activity during the recent war have not been studied sufficiently. This would be one more example of that sort. Another is the handling of propaganda policy during the war, which has not been fully explored. There would be one giant project emerging here on the analysis and evaluation of wartime experience in these areas.

Goldhamer: The analysis of those wartime experiences, however, would probably have to be split up among projects which were designed to deal with a particular problem, and each person would have to exploit those materials according to his own needs. The intent of Project 1:4 (Substitute for Fear as a Motive for Preparedness) was that there is a great deal of use of fear psychology in order to create an interest in various measures that are considered necessary from either a political or military standpoint. The question arises whether that is the most effective way of securing measures in which fairly wholehearted agreement of the population is desirable. From that standpoint, I'm a little surprised that the project elicited relatively little response. Of course, the question does arise whether in some circumstances it isn't highly desirable to promote fear, but I think the intent of the project is to determine when it is and when it isn't, and when benefits from fear might be counteracted by the disorganizing consequences of it.

Marquis: I'll go along with you; I think that an important problem. I remember that at the time of the Bikini Tests there was a great deal of discussion as to whether it should be played up as a dreadful instrument or played down, and so far as I heard there wasn't any answer.

Goldhamer: One comment that was made indicates that perhaps the disesteem in which the project was held was due mostly to the very considerable ambiguity of the method. It would seem then that we might say that, reconsidering it now, we attach higher value to this project than our original discussion on the record would indicate.

Mosteller: About Project 1:2e, Emotional Impact of Atomic Bombing, I'm afraid that in the panel we may have been too hidebound about this kind of thing. At first blush it looks a little vague. But if you try to ask yourself what are the basic psychological

Mosteller: problems that we're interested in here, and try to reformulate these problems a little differently, you'll see sometimes that there is a lot there that would interest you.

Goldhamer: I would agree that there are aspects of this problem, broadly interpreted, that certainly might turn out to be very useful. The project, after all, was a proposal for a specific piece of research which intends to use the concrete instances of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; and we might evaluate it in terms of the specific proposals. I don't think anyone who reads the rejection of this particular proposal would therefore assume that we are disinterested in the emotional impact of atomic bombings. At the first session Panel 1 decided that Project 1:3, Psychological Effect of a Reconnaissance Satellite, had a low priority, because of the special nature of the gadget involved, and the feeling that the considerations of the psychological and socialogical aspects of the problem would be outweighed by considerations arising from practical everyday uses of the gadget. What is the Panel's attitude if the problem is reformulated in the following manner? What is known about the behavior of individuals, groups, organizations and governments when they know that their actions are constantly observed and reported, as opposed to their behavior when they are free to conceal their actions? What is known about the cross-cultural differences in this respect? What kind of research needs to be done on this problem? What Mosteller has done is to point out the problem as one, not so much of an extraordinary event like a satellite in general, but of the consequences of the fact that the satellite is supposed to observe and record what's going on. That, of course, is one particular context in which it could be presented to them. It seems to me that psychologically its major impact would come simply by virtue of a somewhat Buck Rogerish accomplishment. Every time something gets a little closer to the type of Amazing Story magazine phenomena, people make all sorts of inferences that are certainly extremely important. One only has to think of the Orson Welles "Man from Mars" business. I would like to suggest that, important as this one particular context of reconnaisance may be, it should not be conceived as the whole of the psychological significance.

Benedict: I feel that this whole problem is a highly cultural one, differing very much among European nations and the United States. It is properly a study of the relatively stable values in different countries. Then comes the issue, if it is another nation that is watching, whether it's an invasion of sovereignty. And this we can predict anyway, that an invasion of sovereignty will always be resented. We don't need to study it, we know it already.

Goldhamer: I would like to propose this as the type of concrete question that arises about a gadget of this sort: There are many persons who are unconvinced or are somewhat cynical about the fact that the future might bring the end of civilization. They feel that certain defense measures can be taken. One out of many psychological applications that might be made of an affair of this sort, is a demonstration of what I'm sure the masses would react to as the extraordinary powers of science. If you can have a satellite spinning around the earth more or less on a regular schedule, that represents at least an approach to the realization of what they had vaguely suspected might happen in the year 2500 A.D. Here it has happened today. What sort of consequences will people infer from that with respect to what any future war will be? Will it convince them that nothing but complete suicide is sure to result? Assuming that at a given moment the launching of such a satellite

Goldhamer: is to be undertaken, would we as social scientists feel it desirable that the context in which it is launched, the press releases which accompany that launching, be determined by social scientists or by the people who invented the gadget? Is the event of sufficient significance to justify a group of social scientists in deciding on the press releases and the context in which it should be launched?

Benedict: The great problem is one of international relations and sovereignty. What national team is observing whom? And of course social scientists have something to say about that. If you can launch it wholly as a means of observing weather conditions, then that's different; but if you can't, then it's a problem of international relations and spying. That seems to me the great problem about the satellite. You raised another problem, that of the watching eye, and whether people work better under it or not. That's a cultural problem; that's always included in any cultural study, any study of national character. But here it seems to me that is not involved; it's sovereignty. What team is watching whom? If it's under an adequate UN sponsorship, that is completely different from an American team, and that seems to me the great problem in the satellite.

Berelson: With respect to Project 1:2c; Morale of Potential Allies, on the assumption that England and France, for example, are also important, as well as the U.S. and USSR, some consideration ought to be given somewhere to the problem of studying the development of attitudes and opinions, morale generally, and the factors affecting it in those countries.

Goldhamer: I agree wholeheartedly with that. Its neglect in the original record is not in any way an indication of our depreciation of it.

Marquis: On the general question of the morale index, (Project 1:2a), I think we agreed that it was difficult to get a single morale index.

Goldhamer: The apprehension index ought to be broadened to take into account things other than the population's degree of worry about just physical attacks. I took it that it probably also referred, for instance, to the level of anxiety that might result from a threat of a depression or from various other things as well. I would like to add that what we need is a set of morale indices -- 'morale' is a very broad term.

PANEL II
ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS

F. Mosteller (Chairman)

R. Benedict	E. Kris
B. Berelson	F. Lorimer
H. Goldhamer	D. Marquis
C.L. Hull	S. Stouffer

Hull: On "U.S. Goals and Values", I don't think our so-called experts are very expert; I don't think what's obtained is very valuable, or based on something more than the ordinary person has. You'd get the reactions of a certain very restricted class of citizens, and they would not be at all typical. A better way would be to make quite an extensive poll of a number of different classes of citizens, say men, women, different age groups, etc. You'd probably get a significant difference between the different ones. It would be a little more concrete if you take the matter of age. If you found out that there was a characteristic and consistent difference in the matter of age, you would be able to get a beginning of one of those empirical laws that are operating in the physical sciences.

Benedict: If one gets a characteristic difference in age, it may be that when people get to be the same age they will have the same opinions.

Hull: That seems to be an open question. Perhaps it is a case that needs to be investigated.

Benedict: Exactly, it has to be an open question.

Goldhamer: I am puzzled by the significance here of the committee of philosophers. I take it that the aim is to find out what values people actually hold. On the other hand, the reference to the philosphers leads one to feel there's a confusion here -- that perhaps what was intended was to find out what values people ought to hold or what sort of valuations are consistent, whether psychologically they exist side by side or not. I can see the utility of the latter only in terms of aid that might be given in clarification of policy. I certainly think it's a requisite that policy makers at high levels should be clear as to what goals they are trying to pursue. On the level of the population at large this is a straight sociological and social psychological investigation of what it is people are actually after in life.

Benedict: And also what they do rather than what they say.

Mosteller: We mustn't delimit the idea of "philosophers" too much. A few philosophers are really beginning to get interested in applying some little of what they know to everyday problems. There are a few schools of philosophy that are beginning to worry

Mosteller: that way these days. It may well be that those were the people the person who recommended this research method had in mind. I imagine you can replace "philosopher" by almost anyone else you'd like to see there.

Marquis: It seems perfectly clear that there are two distinct problems on this page (2:1). One of them is the ideological area, that is, the national ideals which would be determined by an anthropologist or historian looking at the country as a whole; the other is the social psychological study of the goals and values of individual people. I can see merit in both. The first problem has been attacked repeatedly by intelligent people; I don't think it has quite the urgency or necessity of the second. I should like to speak for a social and psychological study. As far as I know, there has never been a survey of the goals and ideals of people in this country. I'd like to see more ingenuity used in the form of the questions. I should like to see it done with accurate samplings, and with breakdowns. It will be meaningful for a wide range of application and interpretation. The methods by which it can be done are perfectly clear; they have been established in other fields. We can do factor analysis to determine corps attitudes and we can relate them to external criteria; we can determine the values and goals of business men as compared to professional men; etc. But such a study seems to be absolutely basic for any planning of, not mere propaganda, but what can one get away with in national policy, and what are the best approaches. Right now, for example, the State Department would like to know how to sell the Marshall Plan. They're completely in the dark as to how to go about it. They would like to have much more information about whom they're selling it to, what kind of people they are. If this study were done fairly and extensively, it would find usefulness in a hundred different directions. It would essentially be a handbook of what I consider the most important dimensions for the description of people in this country. I imagine a philosopher such as Charles Morris, who is interested in the value structure of people, would be a very useful person to get in at the beginning stages where you're formulating the stuff for pre-test. There are dozens of social psychologists who have worked on attitude scales and whose experience in that would be useful. There are the actual survey procedures already worked out etc; that would be the least difficult thing. The important thing would be the formulation of the scales. I should like to see those scales develop in two directions: one, so you could compare the intensity of one value attitude or goal with another in the same person; and two, a measure that would permit a comparison relative to other people, in that goal. This is a more complicated type of attitude scale or value measurement than has been done before. I should like to extend that, to measure the attitude relative to a group average.

Kris: Permit me to introduce specific values. I would select two, which seem to me basic because they give to other values their place: attitudes which tend to increase participation of the individual, and attitudes which tend to increase privatization of the individual. (Much of the intent to survey values is concerned with facts, not ideology -- i.e., not with stated values but with effective incentives to action.) What is the trend towards participation as against privatization? I would consider that a urgent study. We can establish, approximately, conditions under which it is likely that privatization will considerably increase; we can state the conditions under which it is likely that participation will consistently increase. I tend to believe that the less clarity about the situation to be expected in the future exists, the more it is likely that the tendency toward participation will be overcome.

Goldhamer: The 'privatization' seems to be used here as equivalent to privatization with respect to politics. Is this another word, then, for political apathy? One of the problems that would require very close investigation is the incidence of a high level of participation in the psychological sense. In a large measure, one could show that high levels of psychological participation are by no means inconsistent with political apathy. Relative to what Marquis said, I think we shouldn't forego whatever advantages might come from the use of scales. I have a strong feeling in this field as compared to other fields that here one needs an investigation that searches out very carefully the course of an individual's life career, the kind of reactions that he makes to various deprivations or losses of different types of values, and the kind of response he makes when he receives values of particular types. I would much rather see investigations carried on almost at the clinical level with relatively few persons than less intensive mass studies in this particular field.

Berelson: I, too, felt that the suggestion about political apathy was very relevant here, and want only to reinforce what Kris has said. The problem is not only one of determining the sources of political apathy and thus to get some insight into the means of modifying it (that seems to be the desirable thing to do. There is also the problem of the consequences or the effects of political apathy. Certain hypotheses could be stated, for example, about the reaction of apathetic as against alert people to crisis situations. Briefly, there is not only the area of sources or causes, but also the area of consequences and effects.

Mosteller: To summarize: We seem to be very well agreed that this is an important and urgent problem. We are not precisely agreed as to the means we might take to carry out studies, although we would like considerable effort to be taken to consummate the study. And I think that we are also more or less agreed that Projects 2:1 and 2:1' are essentially part of exactly the same problem.

Kris: Following up a suggestion of Goldhamer's: Surely in many cases, intensive interview methods and extensive methods are to be kept apart; but that doesn't mean that we cannot combine intensive interview methods with exact measurements. I consider that one of the decisive advances we have been making, that interview methods need not be considered as of less accuracy than the others.

Hull: I should like to add to Charles Morris, whom Marquis suggested, as a good person to carry on this work, Prof. Thurstone of the University of Chicago. Thurstone is especially competent in quantification. It seems to me if the State Department wants to find out immediately how to handle the Marshal Plan, it would be necessary to know how people all over the country react to a number of values. That doesn't include the clinical kind of study at all.

Berelson: A continuing study of the trends and the causes in the changes of opinions on international affairs would seem to be a basic concern of RAND. One might want to go so far as to set up if possible (and I think it is possible) some reasonable experimental situations in which efforts to modify attitudes on international affairs in a given community could be tried, and the various means of changing attitudes could be identified and isolated.

Hull: One of the necessities of any study of a comparative nature is something that will be stable. You've got to have a reference point, and if possible a "zero" reference point, i.e., something that is pretty neutral naturally, that would not be influenced by an atomic bomb, say. (This goes into the whole matter of quantification.

Hull: Quantification has been very feebly developed in the polling studies, but it is being and should be developed imperatively if we are going to do anything about such problems.)

Benedict: There are two problems to study, one is the great core attitudes, the general continuing bases in the society, and one is public opinion as situations change; but you only predict what those changes in public opinion will be on the basis of knowledge of these core attitudes. Project 2:3 would be valuable if it were a codification of existing theories and views, in terms of hypotheses that have been verified. Project 2:3 seems to me of great and increasing importance. But I question its great emphasis on opinion polls; I doubt whether the opinion polls will be the whole answer. The problem that Hull discusses seems to me to be of importance. It's one thing to talk about values in the sense in which people value their food, personal security, etc., and quite a different matter to study the periodic hysteria about international relations in this country. The former are our continuing attitudes, firmly bound up in the person and in America; the particular kind of attitude toward another nation is a very circumstantial one, and should be so regarded.

Hull: This whole problem is enormously important in both a peace or war situation. Whether people will fight or not depends on how much they value certain things. For example, some cultures might value food very highly whereas other cultures would put enormous value upon national prestige, etc. If we knew enough to lay these values out on a scale for the Americans, Russians, Japanese, or whatever nations, we could get some idea of how we could appeal to them. We don't know these things of course. We do get impressions but they are qualitative, and they are not systematic. These things can be made quantitative; it's a rather simple thing to do if you have money to do it. I think this is of enormous importance.

Goldhamer: I would like to suggest a subsidiary project that might enable Project RAND to decide what within this immense field might be most relevantly studied. It might be worthwhile to set up a group that would investigate together with persons, say, in the State Department, and other relevant circles what policy decisions have been reached in the recent past and what information with respect to what people were thinking about international affairs, or how much they prized housing, etc., was lacking but felt at the time to be desirable. It is conceivable that questions of this character have been occurring daily and will occur in the near future in almost every policy decision made in Washington. I think we could limit our research more fruitfully if we know what questions these people are asking when they try to reach these decisions.

Benedict: Since it is always the crucial problem to furnish the question to which an answer is needed, I have some doubts of this procedure. Phrasing the important question to be answered, if it really is a difficult problem which is involved, is not likely to be provided by the State Department in any form suitable for a research problem.

Goldhamer: Then perhaps part of our job is to teach them how to evaluate this problem in the way we're talking.

Hull: I would suppose that there's the place where the experts, such as we are supposed to be, would come in. I don't think our opinion of the outcome of the study would be very valuable. But, we know how to do it, and we would probably

Hull: know much better than the State Department the sort of questions to ask, and something more about how to go about answering them. I think we are expert on that.

Marquis: I would be glad if the State Department will cooperate; they do need more information, it's true. The State Department is gradually learning the tremendous value of this type of information for their policy decisions. They need much more, and the fact that they have been softened up already indicates that they would accept much more; that seems to be the experience of those who are consulting with them.

Marquis: There are three problems we have here. The first is an attempt to get at the relatively changeless or enduring aspects of attitudes -- that was the study of values. Then there is second, a necessity for knowledge of topical opinion, in which you are looking for the trends and fluctuations. Those two are guides to policy and deliberation of various sorts. The third is the study of the factors that influence opinions, of which propaganda is only one. (Therefore I don't like to see 2:3 phrased in terms of propaganda but rather in terms of factors influencing opinion.) By repeated trend studies, one could make inferences about those factors that go well beyond propaganda. We could then recognize as part of these three tasks first, a domestic and, second, a foreign and cross-cultural study.

Hull: If you did have these parallel data on four or five different cultures, the difference would strike you in the face, and you couldn't overlook them if you wanted to.

Kris: If you have two dimensions you ought to have a third, namely, the reaction to change. The assumption has been made that the basis values are to be taken as constant. I doubt that. The personal reaction to cruelty, for example, has been changing over the last twenty years to an astonishing extent; and I very sharply make the point that we do not know which values have what resistance to change under what conditions. For instance, if we assume for a moment that atomic bombing were to become a means of regular warfare, the inference seems to be plausible that it would effect a large number of apparently unchangeable attitudes, and that social change might then include change of the value structure. The assumption that the value structures of individuals or groups change only because the young get old or the old get older is surely, in the period of such changes we are witnessing now, not very helpful, because values may change even in a comparatively short time. My general hunch is that past historians entirely overlooked the fact that people's values have changed under the impact of events. They talked only about the leaders and the people as human beings became anonymous.

Benedict: I feel strongly in agreement with Kris; the only point is that one starts with what one's got. Even in an isolated Eskimo community the culture isn't absolutely unchanging. An unchanging culture isn't possible.

Benedict: It is unfortunate in this first paragraph of 2:3, "Public Opinion and Propaganda", that the emphasis is upon trying to determine what part of the influence should be assigned to the home, the school, the church, news items, newspaper editorial, etc. That is an unfortunate research method. There are many other well-known ways of going about it that are more valuable than the attempt to assign a particular weight to each one.

Mosteller: Project 2:1a (Coordination of Opinion Studies) seems to me a rather simple idea and an important one, and I think an extremely easy one to carry out.

Berelson: Dave Truman at Williams College has the past studies of the Roper public opinion polls and he, with his students, is going to study them, reanalyze them deeply. But this is not an answer to 2:1a, as I understand it. This project seems to me to be setting up an administrative program in order to get the polls to supply more data for various government agencies, which is all to the good. It ought to be added here that, even at that level, there is a lot of data which is buried and lost in Roper, Gallup, and NORC polls, because they never analyze the data fully enough. People who afterwards reanalyze the material in those studies can probably secure a good deal of useful information. That function ought to be added to the aims stated in 2:1a.

Mosteller: I am very glad to know that Truman has Roper data. Cantril of the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton University has archives of Gallup. That makes two of them. Any reasonable approach to this problem should make them quite valuable to such an organization as we contemplate, by making them all available for serious study.

Hull: Doesn't 2:1a contemplate planning in advance? We are now talking about something that has already been done. What is suggested here is much more useful. It is in the way of coordination; and one of the great failings of the social scientists is that they are not coordinated. They don't fit together and don't add up.

Mosteller: There should be development of methods. All of the research method given here is obvious. There is an organization already in existence which is capable of doing a lot of good work on this, namely, the SSRC, which is interested in opinions and attitudes and has set up some committees. Sam Stouffer is, I believe, the chairman of this committee, and there are a number of projects under it. The thing for us to do with this project is to let it stand almost as it is, and load it on to that committee's back. A lot of people that RAND is interested in are on that committee; people like Gallup and Roper, Wilks and Lazersfeld. There is a beautiful interlocking there.

Goldhamer: It is also worth mentioning the change that has taken place in the status of NORC, which is moving to Chicago. Organizations that are attached to a university and are concerned primarily with research, rather than the work Gallup and Roper do primarily for publications, would probably be a more useful tie-in for RAND.

Mosteller: There is one other organization that should be mentioned: the organization at Iowa State which does considerable work for the State government and also does research into polling and sampling methods.

Goldhamer: Another group that may be worth mentioning (Berelson should have, but he is chairman of the group and probably wouldn't want to mention it) is one that was organized last year at the University of Chicago, the Communications Committee, which I think might be exploited for some tasks of this Panel.

Marquis: The University of Michigan has a new affiliate group which moved from the

Marquis: Department of Agriculture, where for eight years they were doing work for the Treasury, Federal Reserve, and State Departments as well as Agriculture, to a position in the university structure where they can have a little more freedom in the work they do. They are still continuing work for those governmental departments; the Federal Reserve study is probably the one that is best known to you. There is the possibility that you could use this group for a function which is harder to get out of Roper, Gallup, etc., namely, research planning and secondly, better interviewing. Their interviewers are all personally trained and are able to do what sometimes is called depth interviewing, though it isn't strictly that.

Mosteller: Project 2:1b I gather elicits little or no enthusiasm from anyone.

Kris: It would be very interesting to know about motivations. But I think it would be interesting to study the sort of personality structures and social circumstances which operate in this area in predisposing individuals. I am not quite certain what method is intended. I find here cooperation with the FBI, which is fine, but then also, public opinion surveys, which I can't by any stretch of the imagination combine with information coming from the FBI. It would be very interesting to know how that would be done.

Lorimer: Somebody might like to know the size of the group with marked pro-Russian feelings. Cooperation with the FBI might be to determine what is a current Communist.

Marquis: Perhaps a systematic study of the Daily Worker by a group of social scientists would give a more direct analysis of the party line.

Goldhamer: Study of the party line ought to be carried on in cooperation with content analysis. Probably political scientists can keep track of the various factional groups in the United States more effectively than the FBI. I could suggest one possibility to which the FBI might be relevant, and which could bring in the public opinion survey at the same time. The FBI, or whatever agency keeps track of these things, might specify individuals who fall in the group we are discussing. It might then be feasible to send out public opinion interviewers with an arranged list of questions who would interview these people, supposedly at random, and other persons who are known to be not at all in this group. There is the possibility that one might be able to distinguish patterns of response between the one group and the other and that one could then outline public opinion polling on a large scale (at least for very short time intervals, since the pattern might change very rapidly) to determine the incidence of this sector of the population. But I don't feel that this study has as much urgency as the other ones we have considered. I suspect that the statement of utility here is not very accurate, and that most of the persons who might be a threat to internal security aren't probably the ones who go around on the street carrying the Daily Worker or who talk to public opinion polls.

Kris: I wouldn't give this project any urgency from the point of view of the data, because I presume that some government agency has the information which is aimed at here. If you were to ask me whether it might be important for policy-makers to know how likely certain people are to be influenced by pro-Russian feeling I would definitely say that that might be important to policy-makers. A very important job for the social scientists would be to analyze the predispositions of those who have a definite set of preferences in this direction.

Goldhamer: A type of research that might be valuable in this foreign field (2:2) is one which would outline forms of stimulation that on the whole are equivalent in different countries. For instance, if one takes a recent novel that has been translated and has achieved some form of international circulation, it might be quite revealing to find out how people in different countries evaluate the characters and actions of people in those novels. The same could certainly be done with movies. (From that standpoint I suppose the recent situation in England is very unfortunate; perhaps American movies will go back there; in any case they certainly exist in other countries.) I feel that researches of that sort might be much more revealing than the public opinion type of study. In any case, we ought not to let the apparatus of public opinion research paralyze our thinking with respect to these other techniques.

Mrs. Benedict: I would like to say something, too, on the great value of that kind of study. It seems to me, however, that it should be incorporated in larger, overall studies. There is then the greatest cross-fertilization of ideas between studies of movies, books, etc. It would be unfortunate to set up a movie or book project which was not incorporated in a study of the geographic or culture area. I have a project that I am working on with a considerable group of people, which is using movies and novels incorporated with a general study of family structure, political behavior, army behavior, etc. in Europe. The insight one gets for further work in the total cultural picture is of the greatest value. I did not submit any such project because of the utmost necessity in working so closely with people of all nations that the project not be classified.

Kris: Project 2:2 is extremely important, and it should be given serious attention. However, I feel that there is no base line to start from. In other words, what did people think about the U.S. before the specific acts? I have a feeling that with the change in potential in Western Europe, a change in attitudes to America has been taking place. Years ago we engaged in some such study as far as one country is concerned: I only know what has been going on in England, and there the rapid change is absolutely visible and frequently discussed. It seems to me that you would have to first establish for each area which you investigate the base-line attitudes, and then investigate how this is being changed by specific political action in the United States. I suggest then that this be supplemented by a study of attitudes to America in various areas, which would be the basic for a regular report. It is a task of political intelligence using social science methods. The people who do it know pretty well how one does such a thing; most of us have done it one time or another during the war. You don't expect to find new truths about human nature; it's a reporting job.

Berelson: I wonder whether Project 2:2 can't be supplemented in another way, whether the stimuli to changes in those attitudes can't be generalized beyond what is stated here. You could study the effect upon foreign attitudes of acts and pronouncements of other countries as well as the U.S., and various other factors. It is important to know about the development of foreign attitudes on international affairs; and everything that effects them (of which U.S. acts or pronouncements is only one set of stimuli) ought to be considered.

Goldhamer: I would agree with that; and yet I think there is a danger in carrying this generalized research too far, because there may be no limit, and we are not quite sure how we are going to apply the knowledge that we get. I think the present formulation points to this situation: American statesmen, public figures, and private persons of some prestige, are constantly making speeches that are publicized in the foreign

Goldhamer: press and on the radio. These persons have some intention, presumably to convey something or to influence opinion; it certainly would be important to know, not simply what the effect on foreign attitudes is of these U.S. acts, but also whether the effect is the one intended. Of course, we might later find out or decide that the effect intended is not the one that, on the basis of other considerations, ought to have been intended. But first we really need to know, if Secretary Marshall or President Truman makes a speech, whether what they hope to accomplish by that speech *is* accomplished. I would rather see a little more emphasis on making the research deal with some of these problems that would be of value to persons who are acting in a public capacity.

Berelson: Certain U.S. agencies have affiliates abroad who are doing opinion studies in foreign countries all the time. You might add to 2:1a the coordination of opinion studies by U.S. agencies in foreign countries, and turn that over to the SSRC.

Marquis: There's one country to which this is not applicable, and it's the one in which we're perhaps the most interested -- Russia. No mechanism occurs to me for training our agents in Russia in methods of sampling and interviewing, and asking them to get their intelligence in ways which have been demonstrated to be more effective than those which are customarily used. Panel 9, which deals with intelligence, has shown no suggestion in all its projects of systematic interviewing as a way of getting at opinion in foreign countries, though Project 9:2d comes close to it.

Lorimer: On Project 2:2b (Pro-U.S. Russian Attitudes), the students of Russian affairs, including Kennan of the State Department, are in general agreement that there are very serious tensions within the USSR. Those tensions are not in terms of pro-American or anti-American sentiment, but in terms of the freedom of engineers, the distribution of income, the freedom of scientists, personal freedom with regard to espionage, etc. It is also, I think, felt by the Russian experts that one cannot assume a rigid constancy in the Russian political structure indefinitely. In the future there may be, when certain changes take place, a realignment of power. It might make quite a difference in what realignments of power take place, how intense the anti-secret police feeling is, etc. Therefore, it seems to me that one possibility of American action might be to attempt to stimulate and possibly direct pro-democratic, pro-rational, pro-scientific, pro-liberal forces within the USSR. There are a number of research problems that would have to be faced before such a program could be carried through with any confidence. It would involve, in the first place, the analysis of the social structure of the USSR; it would require a careful study of the sensitive points; it would probably also involve studies of the literature, in order to know the sensitive points in which tension might be increased, i.e., the relative efficacy of various schemes (e.g., how various identifications of the present regime hit the sensitive point). It would require a considerable analysis of the present intellectual structure within Russia. Some studies would be appropriate to this group, I would suppose -- e.g., the study of possible infiltration techniques behind an iron curtain, partly on the basis of analogies to the types of activities which influenced thought within Germany and Japan etc., and partly on theoretical experimental possibilities. Finally, there could be a check-up on the efficacy of the program along the lines suggested by Marquis, in which you plant some apparently innocuous lines of activity, get people to talk about them, and then see if they had taken effect. If in your propaganda you have spread a particular story which they couldn't possibly have know except by reading the Daily Worker, you can find whether that has had any impact on the people's thinking. You might plant some items in the propaganda solely for the

Lorimer: purpose of discovering this. This is a field with which I have been a good deal concerned from the standpoint of general interest in Russian development. And it's one that might be appropriate for this panel to work on, perhaps very much more appropriate than the study of how to increase Russian good-will towards America.

Goldhamer: It is well to keep in mind whether it's important in the immediate future to change the opinions of ruling groups. One might attack the problem in this fashion. It's an old political trick to force decision makers into a new line by altering the opinions of the masses. Even in the highly authoritative countries there's no question that the sentiments of the masses are not completely disregarded. Any attempt to manipulate Russian opinion should take into account what utility that might have in putting pressure on the elite.

Lorimer: One might distinguish between three groups: (1) the group represented in the Politburo, the central controlling group; (2) the group of intellectual elite, made up of the engineers and scientists etc; (3) the broad masses. I was thinking of the effects on the second and third; the analysis might lead to possibilities of particular importance for effects on the second.

Goldhamer: The wealth of material unearthed recently on Russian population has more value than is popularly attributed to population studies. I was wondering to what extent inferences can be made from movements of populations and changes in the birth rates and death rates in different parts of the country. That might be very difficult to study, because we have no access to Russian population except by very covert methods.

Lorimer: There was one thing in connection with the matter of births that bears on another problem, indirect indices of attitudes. I don't know how much this should be interpreted, but I was rather disturbed by the USSR adoption of a drastic pro-natalist program in July, 1944. Considerable parts of the national budgets were allotted to encourage additional births, with, I should say, the most blatant of any pro-natalist scheme ever developed by any country, going up to the ninth, tenth, and eleventh child. In fact, highest honors were given to the mother of ten or more children. And that was adopted at a time of great strain, while the war was still on. Now, on an emotional basis, that could be easily interpreted as a feeling there's been a lot of life lost and it's a large country. But if you think of a rational planning group, one might point out that this will place added consumption elements into the population. During the next ten years, the additional babies are going to be a burden at just the time when they are trying to recover from the war. The answer could have meant only that, in view of the exigencies of the future, a very large manpower is essential to the Russian nation. That is something rather different, of course. I do think that the population trend, occupation trend, distribution trend, etc., in many ways reflect social, economic, and cultural changes which are taking place. They might have some relevance to this type of analysis of social change. I don't know of anything else.

Hull: On Project 2:3a (Propaganda in Europe), it is a question whether we know very much about it. I supposed that our secret service did know a great deal about it, but I don't know.

Mosteller: That is the suggestion indicated under the research method, I presume.

Goldhamer: I wouldn't want to express too definite an opinion, but I sometimes wonder if there hasn't been a tendency in recent years (largely, I suppose, because of the internal German experience, and also the expansion of Naziism over Europe) to over-emphasize the significance of propaganda machines. I somehow feel that people worry a little unduly about propaganda that was poured into this country. Apparently our own propaganda has little effect on people here, in many instances, and we are not working under the handicaps that foreign propagandists do. It might be desirable to go a little slowly before feeling that this is quite as important as people formerly had a tendency to believe.

Mosteller: I think the truth is that we are pretty familiar with the propaganda machines of Europe, and that there just isn't very much question about who owns the communication media, nor in what ways they are used to try to bring about changes in attitudes and opinions of populations.

Hull: I would suppose that there might be some doubt as to whether we understand the Russian propaganda machine very well, and I would suggest there are indications that they have an especially potent propaganda. I am under the impression that it is generally agreed that Russian propaganda before the war was so potent that it was able to break down large numbers of inter-group antagonisms within the country, even of a religious nature. And if that is true, it is really something. If they can really do that I am inclined to believe that they have got a kind of propaganda that is more potent than anything we are using. It might be worthwhile to try to look into it.

Kris: It is expected that propaganda is including the use of violence if it is very potent. If propaganda extends to the elimination of life in case of necessity, it is very different from any other.

Hull: Are you implying that Russian propaganda against the Russian church involved murder? I don't know anything about it, but I didn't suppose it went that far.

Kris: I would say that Russian propaganda often included the use of violence, in many cases to the utmost. From the system we have today it seems to be likely that in extreme cases propaganda included the use of violence. The propaganda called at least for the elimination of certain people who were causing trouble.

Benedict: We have quite a bit of information recently on that very subject. That is the general point, not killing necessarily, but removal from all the ways of life which one values. It may be just loss of a job. It may not be a concentration camp, but that is another method of propaganda which should be separated very clearly.

Berelson: The Russian situation has been discussed to a great extent in a book which, though incomplete to date, is a very large scale study, on the basis of original sources, of propaganda outside Russia -- that part of the propaganda organization of Russia which is concerned with extra-territorial propaganda. This book is available or will be in a matter of months. It was written by Lewis Memser of the Department of Justice. A 400-600 page volume has been submitted to the University of Chicago and presumably will be published. It is available now if anyone wants it.

Kris: I would think that although violence is very important, it would be a very great mistake to assume that the very great efficacy of Russian propaganda was only to be interpreted on that basis.

Lorimer: Communist propaganda in North China, in the handling of the nationality problem, followed the general procedure that everybody was free to praise Stalin in his own language. Little girls were brought up from the provinces to put on dances in Moscow; and everyone got a great kick out of it. From having been degraded and despised, they now felt themselves an important part of the society. That, along with the education and the release produced the effect. While we are aware of the very vicious elements in Russian propaganda, we must always guard against ignoring the sources of strength in the right direction. But that isn't leading us to any research; it's just a matter of putting it on the record.

Hull: In connection with 2:3b (Counteracting Communist and Fascist Propaganda), the newspapers seem to indicate that there is a very great and progressive increase in the number of Communists in this country, especially in the labor groups; and the general impression one gets from the newspapers is that this is due to the cleverness of Russian propaganda. I would like to raise the question whether it really is due to the propaganda, or whether it is due to the inherent logic of the situation and the rather bad conditions that these laboring people are in. And it may be a device on the part of the industries in this country who control the newspapers to give an excuse for the bad conditions, which naturally produce such behavior, and attribute it instead to propaganda. In other words, it is a question whether the propaganda is so potent and is producing this progressive shift into the Communist ranks on the part of the laboring people. But I don't know whether in fact there is such a shift. You have an indication in the size of the Communist vote in England, and I was under the impression there were similar changes occuring in this country, but it hasn't gone nearly so far as yet. I don't know.

Mosteller: There is little evidence on the basis of voting, at least, that there is an increase. I think the biggest Communist vote, for the party itself, was cast quite a long time ago.

Hull: But take the situation in France and Italy. There is no doubt about that. You have public records there of the number of people. Of course, they are in strategic positions and they use their power very cleverly, but I imagine there must be considerable numbers of people.

Benedict: The situation in France, in England, and in America can be differentiated very carefully. The turnover in the Communist party, as reported by every student, has been simply enormous in the United States. Of course, that is true in France, too. But this is not true in many other countries, and it makes a very different picture.

Goldhamer: It might be worthwhile, in the event that certain measures are taken for polling Communist groups and propaganda in a country, to keep in mind the possible repercussions that such policies might have in a country whose good will we don't wish to alienate.

Hull: On 2:5 (Logical Analysis of Psychological and Sociological Concepts), you

Hull: can't do that apart from the empirical work. You have to have operational definitions empirically checked, and the people who do that are empirical workers. A great deal of experimental work done by everyone, including the experimental psychologists, is wasted because the people haven't thought through their problems and haven't defined their terms.

Benedict: The topics listed here begin with "morale" and "loyalty". We have been discussing the difficulties of solving morale problems, stating them and getting a concept about them. My feeling is that there is a definite problem that has got to be described in empirical terms for the community or the nation you are working with, and that anything that can be done after one has got such descriptions is valuable. But one should not begin the work there, because that limits it.

Hull: If people are concrete-minded and use the operational method they get someplace. Many people work on problems who really don't know where they are and don't really understand the problem. They don't understand their own language; they don't know what they are talking in a literal sense. The logician has a point of view, but so often the logician is separated from the facts, and he derives formal definitions under the illusion that you can tell things by mere logic and that just can't be done.

Benedict: I have had so much experience in strict anthropological work with an illusory joining together of concepts just under a terminology, and that has played havoc in so many studies. It has had to be fought continuously. The illusion that every student has when he begins to do cross-cultural work is that there is such a thing as the family, or the state, or some of those things which he can follow out in the terms that he is more or less familiar with. That has been one of the greatest handicaps to research. It has had to be fought in terms of operational definitions which are different in the different situations that you are tackling.

Mosteller: One thing I have had the greatest difficulty with in this connection, Mrs. Benedict, is the question of a usable definition of the word "culture". I inquire of my various friends how they define "culture"; some of them define culture as everything, some of them define it as some-of-this and some-of-that and then only by examples; and "culture", except in expressions like "cross-cultural phenomenon", has gradually come to be a useless word because the other fellow never seems to understand what you mean by it. Is that state of affairs noticeable to you?

Benedict: Oh, yes. That is why I haven't used the word "culture" any time today. I find it very, very difficult. "Culture" means to me those things that are specifically (and can be shown operationally to be) learned in a community differentially in different places.

Hull: I would be sorry to have this project thrown aside because of the admitted weakness of a mere logical analysis. I would be in favor of putting into it some of the things Mrs. Benedict has been saying, stressing the necessity of the workers' formulating their problems and giving operational definitions of their terms. I think that is really important.

Mosteller: Do we feel this is really an urgent problem or do we feel this is one that will grow up anyway, and that we need not bother with it here?

Hull: It is liable to grow up too slowly, and it ought to be stressed now. I don't think it is inevitable, because the situation has persisted in psychology for thirty years and hasn't yet been remedied -- and those people have a pretty good chance. I think we need to carry the thing on. I should suppose, for example, that one very serious situation is in Freudian psychology. I think a good deal could be done there. I would like to stress that I have found by actual trial in the use of symbolic logic with a technical logician who was very sophistocated about the data involved, that we were able to define sixty technical terms that had never been defined in that way in psychology before, all on the basis of ten or so basic concepts. You build up a set of definitions very much as you build up a series of theorems.

Berelson: On 2:4 (Psychology of Military Occupation), there are large scale research enterprises doing exactly this, are there not?

Mosteller: I gather from the research method that it is to be a collation of that material plus additional material, which might be gained by methods discussed in our earlier projects.

Benedict: The projects should include more studies of a specific nature of severely sanctioned, deeply cared for, permanent attitudes in America, on the basis of which opinions split for and against. I hoped there would be a good many more propositions about these large patternings in American culture. When we are going into such a subject as Russia or European nations we shouldn't be overpowered by the opinion polling, which is really a recording of this splitting of attitudes for and against a certain core value. We should give a lot more emphasis to the suggestion made about the use of movies, etc. All that fits into a much nicer picture; and I feel that there are great possibilities in that kind of problem.

Mr. Hull: I would like to emphasize having projects coordinated. I mean by coordination, that the projects are so chosen that when they are completed they will add up to something specific. For example, we have a scale in the series that was suggested by Marquis of three types of motivations or values. Now those three studies, if they are carried out in conjunction, would add up to something, although separately they would not. An example in a concrete situation: Suppose you are trying to determine a function; if the observations are all made with only one factor varying, you can plot that factor in terms of some dimension, and then you can get a law; but if the observations are made in a random fashion, they will not be coordinated and you can't get your law. It is no more work to get the observations in such a way that you can get a law out of them than to have them done in such a way that there is no law there. One of the jobs we should do here is to choose a sequence of four or five of these projects that tie together in some way, so that by putting the various results together we could get an additional relationship that we couldn't get by a random carrying out of six other projects.

Goldhamer: Consider the feasibility (or at least the desirability) of listing decisions that may have to be made in the future, or are as a matter of fact already being made in the country today, and trying to see whether in the light of those decisions it isn't possible to coordinate the research. Coordination is generally in terms imposed by the decisions themselves. Decisions have a certain interrelationship, so that research can be to some extent coordinated on that basis. For instance, there is a great deal of agreement that study of the basic values of the American nation is an absolute fundamental; I would like to make any case as strong as

Goldhamer: possible by suggesting that even that study does not seem to me to be as urgent as one might think, unless one can specify just what one would do with that sort of information. For instance, I can foresee decision makers saying we ought to make the population of this country more mobile; one way of doing that is stop building houses and build more trailers. Then the question might arise whether, if people had to live in trailers, they would refuse to work. Perhaps they value the stable, physically fixed home too much. I can see that then one would want to know specifically what the values of the American people are.

Berelson: The selection of projects ought also to be made with an eye on the modifiability of the things which are being studied, especially in this area of attitude and opinions. It's all oriented sooner or later toward the institution of "desirable" attitudes instead of certain other kinds. At any rate, we could set up studies which have an eye toward isolating the factors which, if controllable, can institute changes in opinions.

Marquis: I'd like to underline the first things that Hull said, and then I'd like to comment on Goldhamer's emphasizing the necessity for collecting information and results which would be applicable to immediate problems. I want to disagree for two reasons: (1) that that is very difficult to do; and (2), that we also have to be prepared to answer questions twenty years hence. Let me speak to the second question first. There may possibly be some general principles for more meticulous methods of describing people and their attitudes which could conceivably be relevant to decisions and policies. And if so, we ought to get started on those, because we can not anticipate what decisions and questions are going to arise five or ten or twenty years hence. The only way to prepare a long range program is to study the non-topical aspects of human behavior. The other objection is that it's awfully hard to study just what's going to be needed even if it's only next year. Polls on world organization became out of date within six months, with the change in the Russian attitude. And polls on world organization are just irrelevant to our present policies in international affairs. We just can't foresee the decisions and policies that are going to have to be discussed. Therefore I would like to consider some more effective way of getting results. As a continuing trend, study of opinions may not be the best answer.

Marquis: I suggest a sort of a workshop in which stratified samples of the people who will be the public opinion carriers are brought together and questions proposed to them; maybe an immediate vote is taken, and then discussion continues, and we see how the introduction of new information or the shaping up of conflicts among their present attitudes would modify them. We might see how their attitude toward some immediate and pressing question comes out at the end of the short discussion. For example, Marshall might have pre-tested his plan on some such panel before he gave the address in Boston. I just don't know how it would work. What I'm asking for, if it has possible merit as a way of getting immediate reactions, is that it be tried experimentally and then validated against how public opinion does turn out later. Because people's opinions today do not determine their opinions a month later. However, people's opinions today plus the information and events, etc., of the next month do determine their opinions a month later. Suppose you could get in this discussion panel their opinions today, then introduce what you know is going to be put out in the papers and radio, etc., and see how their opinions are going to turn out. As an exercise you might be able to predict, let us say, the acceptance of a new aspect of foreign policy, or the acceptance of universal military training or

Marquis: something of that sort, in a way which is not possible just from the measurement, even repeated measurement, of opinions on current topics. Essentially what I am saying is that we need a long range program which gets at more basic factors, and in the use of which we can practice during the next five or ten years of making specific predictions. I don't think we yet know how to make specific predictions from a knowledge of character structure, etc. We can be practicing that, developing experts, learning the limitations, etc., as we collect the data. There is also a need to develop a better method for dealing with immediate questions and problems and policies which have to be acted on very soon.

Hull: Isn't it true that the advertizing people have been doing this, more or less, for quite a while?

Mosteller: In a way. You know --, in a way.

Goldhamer: So that the record won't show disagreement on a point on which I don't think there is any disagreement, I would like to add, with respect to Marquis' comments, that when I spoke about decision-making I certainly had no intention of emphasizing in any way that one ought to study those problems that immediately face decision-makers. As far as my point was concerned, one can visualize now the type of very important decision that might arise in twenty years. That at least gives you a specification of what good this project is going to do. I'd like to reemphasize that. I still feel that at least the first criterion that one has to apply is some very specific implication of what anyone can use this information for.

Berelson: Most of the projects we've been discussing in attitudes and opinions have had to do with general mass attitudes and opinions so to speak -- the formation of public opinion and of general values and goals of the population, etc. I'm wondering whether we haven't unduly overlooked (all I can recollect now is one instance) setting up some more specialized analysis of elite attitudes or opinions. By that term I mean to include not just the decision-makers and the government, but business and financial leaders, and leaders in every area of activity. Since those people exercise a great deal more power over what happens than general mass opinion, since they may have different attitudes and different ways of forming attitudes, and since different sources of information go into their opinions than those of the general population, it might be particularly useful to make them the subject of special study. Moreover, they are the opinion leaders of whole groups of followers. One of the areas I suppose one would study in formation of general public opinion is the role of the opinion leader, which again carries on into the general area of formation of the opinion of the leader. I can't think of any large-scale enterprise of that sort in this panel.

Stouffer: There's a related topic, the process of dissemination of opinion throughout the community, not necessarily by big-shot means, but by local nuclei. I have in mind the type of study done by Rydon Neltz (?), in which he made an effort to find out who influenced whom and tried to trace the dissemination of opinion in several states.

Project 2:1 (U.S. Goals and Values), as revised, leaves me rather breathless. Something like this definitely needs to be done, but I hate to see all of this money thrown into a clinical study. If you are going to get at basic values and core

Stouffer: attitudes, you need some better methods of measurements than we've got now. I am worried about the problem of analyzing the vast amounts of data. A project somewhat similar to this is being conducted at Harvard this year. Ten subjects (who were paid one dollar an hour) were interviewed for thirty hours each by a team of an anthropologist, psychologist, sociologist, psychometrician and psychiatrist. They gave them every test they could think of ---T.A.T., Rorschach, everything under the sun -- collected case histories, an enormous amount of material. All these interviews were recorded. The diagnostic council, using Murray's (?) general methods, had probably sixty hours of conferences discussing these cases. All of these conferences were recorded. The focus was on the basic values these people had which affected their attitude toward Russia. This procedure was regarded as a way of getting hunches and ideas which would help them to form some operational concepts of attitude formation which could be tested more effectively some other way. They have now a room full of documents which they haven't begun to analyze, except in a sense they have already been analyzed in these numerous discussions. They have made cross-section surveys of Springfield, Massachusetts, in which they took some very explicit hypotheses that grew out of the clinical work and tried to examine them in terms of the responses people gave in Springfield. They did this as a panel study, and about two months later repeated the same study on the same people so that gave them some changes in time. They were interested a) in the relation of some personality variables and sociological variables to attitudes, and b) the relation of these personality variables and sociological variables to the changes in attitudes. That specific phase of it, including a good deal of theoretical analysis, has been written up in the doctor's thesis of Brewster Smith at Harvard just submitted and accepted this fall. (Brewster Smith was with us in the War Department, an extremely able man with a very brilliant and penetrating, theoretical mind, who also knows how to handle data.) We are going ahead this next year. We have a small appropriation to continue this project on much the same terms as we did this year. We are spending the neighborhood of $6,000 a year on this project. That is a small amount of money. It just takes my breath away to think of spending $250,000. One hundred thousand dollars can vanish in a very short time; NORC can spend it in a couple or three surveys. I would like to urge you that this isn't anything to be lightly undertaken. It is something that would require the most exquisite planning and the most exquisite care in the use of past experience; and I am not sure I would like to see this much money thrown into this sort of a project. I would rather see a good deal put into the perfection of some of these subsidiary tools -- let us say, a little better Rorschach test or a little better personality test, before we rush to analyze the relationship among personality variables that we don't now have any decent way of measuring.

Benedict: Basic values and opinion are somewhat different. The utility of the results is described in terms of effective methods of securing public acceptance or disapproval of such policies. But that is a matter of circumstances, of change in policies, it's a matter of changing opinions. Basic values seem to me somewhat different from these changing alignments of opinion, which of course can be studied very closely in relation to differing groups and differing personality structures, but I would prefer to have this called public opinion rather than basic values. It seems to me to be something that is much more deeply inculcated in the group. I have never had any very great luck with opinions material that had come through the IBM Machines, no matter what the correlations were. It seems to me a difficult and expensive way of studying these values.

Marquis: So far as I know it hasn't been tried.

Goldhamer: I would like to suggest this compromise between what Marquis and Stouffer are saying. The problem of the magnitude and cost of this study is largely a function of how many people you want to study. The intention is to set up a project which will successfully study the basic values of a small number of people. The real money and magnitude comes in extending that study over a large population area. Once the initial study has demonstrated that you are accomplishing what you want to, the problem of extending that over a great many people is very simply settled in terms of how much you are willing to investigate to get the information.

Berelson: As I heard Stouffer's outline of what the Harvard project had been, it seems to me that this one is very like it in its initial phase. It would certainly want that sort of intensive analysis, then going into Springfield, so to speak, then redoing it, and then back and forth; so that the research set-up parallels very closely the kind of thing which has been done at Harvard, and which could be done at two or three different places simultaneously but independently. But the project that Stouffer described is one that seems to me of current opinion, dictated by circumstances. If the present project is on basic values, then that makes a very different research problem to me. The problem of studying current opinion on Russia is to me not at all the present objective; and that makes a very great theoretical difference to me in basic research. I feel it is a very different thing.

Benedict: On 2:2a (Coordination of European Opinion Studies), if we are to leave it as it stands, some recognition should be given to the different meaning of answers to the same questions, and to various questions, in the different countries. When the question is asked in France, the answer is then published in a parallel column to America. It is a very different thing. If there is a coordination of results with America, or France with Germany, or France with Holland, some indication of that should be given.

Mosteller: What I understood here by coordination was merely setting up an arrangement whereby the requirements of various government and research agencies could get specific information they wanted from specific countries.

Berelson: These public opinions studies in western Europe, or anywhere, provide a good opportunity for the collection of material relevant to Mrs. Benedict's own concerns and problems. That ought to be mentioned as one of the possibilities in the coordination of these studies.

Mosteller: When such a coordination is worked out it would be extremely useful to more people than just government agencies.

Benedict: On 2:1b, Pro-Russian Feelings in the U.S., in view of what Stouffer said about the projects that have been carried on at Harvard, it seems to me that their continuing activity would be better than a new one.

Stouffer: I am not sure that the Harvard project intends to continue on attitudes toward Russia. We are not interested especially in attitudes toward Russia. That was merely used as an issue to give us a central focus.

Marquis: It might depend on the trend of events (if we can prognosticate the trend well) whether it is worthwhile now devising measures and validating them so they will be available when needed. If it's going to be important, research on it should

Marquis: be done three years before it is needed.

Benedict: In that case, it seems to me desirable that a great deal more emphasis should be given to the changing circumstances than is done in that draft -- the reaction of changing alignments to circumstances which change.

Marquis: I have construed this project more narrowly than it is stated, namely, as the identification of the extreme pro-Russian group. The reason I have done that is that there are continuing polls which measure the mean pro-Russian attitude in our population. That is done by the news polling outfits, and it is also done specifically for the State Department. In order that this project not overlap with ordinary polling, I have construed it as the identification by subtle means of the extreme pro-Russian group. It was with that construction of this project in mind that I made my comment that it should be done three years before it is needed; the other thing is being done now.

Benedict: Relative to 2:1, I did not originally submit a project on basic values in other countries, because it is impossible to do such a study under restricted auspices, and I thought it wasn't possible under RAND. They tell me now there are ways of arranging it. You cannot send anyone under the armed services of any one country even to France to do work on such a problem. There should be international auspices for such a study; there are no international auspices at present for it. If there can be some arrangement by which some additional help can be given in such studies, it would be very desirable, but it depends on the study's being unclassified.

Marquis: As to 2:4, Psychology of Military Occupation, in Panel 4 where they discussed the politics of military occupation, there seemed to be full agreement among people who were more in touch with the present situation than we, that a great deal was being done, that it was being adequately summarized, that a series of reports of real value are coming out, and that there was nothing more to do.

PANEL III
POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

D. Young (Chairman)

M. Andron
R. Benedict
H. Goldhamer
F. Neumann
W.F. Ogburn
E. Shaw
H. Speier
S. Stouffer
S.S. Wilks

Young: I wish somebody would begin by trying to give a statement of the range of problems in political psychology which we ought to cover.

Goldhamer: I would describe the content of this Panel's work as being primarily the psychological processes that underlie the activities of ruling groups or decision-making groups in particular nations. Any analysis of how the leaders operate would have to take into account the considerations in terms of which they do operate. Their interests might be thought of as given data, and one would then analyze what consequences that would have for their actions.

Speier: Does project 3:0 on Political Apathy pertain only to investigation of political apathy in this country or should other countries be included? If it is decided to study the dynamics of political apathy, then some of the countries would afford wonderful material -- I am thinking particularly of occupied countries in Europe.

Goldhamer: That suggests to me the question whether we ought to assume that the utility is one of maximizing political interests. From the standpoint of manipulation we might decide to minimize political interests in some other country.

Speier: I presume the underlying assumption for this project is that democracy prospers when there is intensive participation in the political processes, and that political apathy is the other end of the line and therefore is in itself an undersirable and undemocratic state of affairs. An important subject for consideration would be to examine this assumption -- whether intensive participation in political process is generally desirable, or whether there are certain areas of political or military policy-making in which minimization of popular participation is desirable from some point of view.

Neumann: 'Apathy' may mean very different things. It may mean what it implies. It may also mean a deliberate rejection of participation in politics. Very frequently this is the real meaning of political apathy -- a very deep discontent with a given political system. These are two very different things. They are usually designated by the same term "apathy", but have nothing to do with each other.

Stouffer: Why isn't that capable of being checked by some kind of polling techniques?

Stouffer: If you have several different kinds of apathy, it seems to me quite possible by inquiry to find out who tends to have what kind.

Shaw: In connection with the term "apathy" we seem to have a rational or at least a conscious decision by the members of the general public to participate or not to participate in making a political decision. Isn't there another facet in the indifference of the general public, based on ignorance? Doesn't that suggest some rather specific projects, such as analysis of the policies of state departments or foreign ministries in making perfectly clear to the general public what they are trying to do, to see whether it is consistent or haphazard?

Benedict: It might also suggest a problem of issues presented to the populace in which they did not feel there was a real difference to be decided.

Young: I infer that though we are not entirely happy with the project as it stands, we feel that it is in an area which deserves investigation.

Neumann: On 3:1, Psychology of Russian Foreign Policy, I wonder if you can separate the psychological motivations for decisions regarding foreign policy from those affecting domestic policies -- especially in totalitarian countries, where the two are so intermixed. Wouldn't it be more accurate to say, if the subject is at all worth studying, that it is simply the psychology of Russian decision-making?

Goldhamer: One might compromise on that by saying that the interest of this project would be to study decisions that effect foreign policy; but that would not preclude taking into account other decisions made with respect to internal considerations. To take a specific instance, Lorimer said that during 1944 very strenuous efforts were being made by the Russians to promote as large families as possible, at a time when the facilities for proper care for large families were virtually minimal (and were anticipated to remain minimal for some time to come). It would be of interest to interpret that decision in terms of whether it was motivated by considerations of either present or future international relations or policies. How you differentiate what the relevant elements were in the decision to promote large families at that rather critical stage, I don't know. That would be a matter for Russian experts to decide, if it can be decided. But I can see that analytically one could separate motivations arising out of foreign policy considerations from those arising out of deliberations on internal affairs.

Speier: For research method, you would have mainly two or three ways of attacking it. You could use as your data the records of negotiations, if you had access to them. You could interview participants in such conferences, and you could interview Russian renegades. (I have some doubts as to the usefulness of the last type of interviews for exploring this type of question -- I think interviewing Russian renegades very good if you want to find out something about Russian renegades, but not necessarily if you want to find out something about the psychology of the Russian policy makers.) The basic body of material you have is the record of international conferences, if you can get access to them. That means that the present project and 3.2a (Soviet Diplomatic Techniques) are rather closely related simply in terms of available data. You have to use something a little more removed from the immediate access to the psychology of the individuals concerned.

Goldhamer: In at least some spheres of international action, it is proved that people

Goldhamer: send up trial balloons or make certain preparations in the home press, etc. I know those probably occur in less crucial instances, but none the less that suggests a possibility of being able to predict, even though only twenty-four hours in advance. One could see the extension of similar techniques by analyses of statements that are made, etc., as to what may be coming in the future. I don't see why there is any need to limit this to the analysis of international conference reports. Perhaps the analysis of certain other data might be much more relevant.

Neumann: I stress the impossibility of carving out the sphere of foreign policy motivations of the Russian elite because these cannot be discerned simply from studying international conferences since decisions are not reached at international conferences. They are merely manifested at international conferences. In order to study the psychology of Russian leadership, first let us study to what extent they are motivated by doctrines, by Marxism and Leninism, to what extent they are motivated by the tradition of the Russian state which transcends the specific character of Bolshevism, to what extent they are motivated by certain emergency situations, to what extent they are motivated by reaction to pressures from outside or pressures from inside. It is to my mind impossible, if the subject is really studied, to take just conference reports. You will find a fairly universal pattern in conference reports, a high degree of legalism, a very high degree of attention to protocol, etc., which have been described quite frequently and from which you learn practically nothing except how we behave in conferences in order to beat them or to get anywhere. But if the project is really worthwhile, I think it means actual analysis of the Soviet Union in terms of political psychology. That's what it amounts to.

Goldhamer: May I make an additional comment as an illustration of types of techniques that we ought not to be afraid to exploit. Sometimes they seem to be just a little on the side of the fantastic and people are very cynical about them, but none the less we ought not to overlook them. I am especially led to make the remark because the methods suggested in many of these researches are on the formal and traditional level. What I have in mind is illustrated in some of the speeches of President Roosevelt and other public figures during the last war. At one fairly crucial stage in the war President Roosevelt made a speech in which he made a very interesting slip of the tongue; when he intended to say 'Iceland' he said 'Ireland' and shortly thereafter American troops were sent to Ireland. There are a number of rather interesting cases in which public figures have made these slips of the tongue, which of course are easily interpreted or seem easy to interpret *post facto*. I do not know to what extent people would be willing to risk decisions on the basis of interpretations of that type, but none the less, such analyses should not be overlooked. With some degree of diffidence, perhaps, I would suggest that in international conferences and other places where people deliberate, it wouldn't be at all out of the way for people to make analyses of all the small, irrelevant tension indicating behaviour that people indulge in in various stages of the conference -- I mean the degree of what seem to be superficially irrelevant gestures, facial expressions, etc. I know that that does not really seem to be the basis for adequate social science work to many people, but it is curious that when we have to deal with persons in a clinical setting, we don't scruple at all to make very important interpretations from the fact that at a particular stage of the conversation the person stops and reaches down and tightens his shoe laces, or something quite trivial of that sort. We make very fruitful interpretations on the basis of such trivial gestures, and I would like to see some attempt made, not to abandon conventional sources, but to include these somewhat more imaginative techniques.

Wilks: I have been wondering to what extent the State Department is working along the lines of this project, whether we shouldn't raise the question whether this really isn't a State Department job, or at any rate a cooperative job between RAND and the State Department, if it is decided that something like that should be undertaken.

Goldhamer: On 3:2a, Soviet Diplomatic Techniques, some attempt has been made by Leites to show just what are the types of criticisms or attacks that are made on Soviet activities to which the Russian leaders are sufficiently sensitive so that they consider it necessary to deal with them in rebuttal through the Russian press to the Russian masses. Particular study of that point might be relevant, because it suggests certain weak points to which they are sensitive; if one can influence the masses with respect to those points, apparently those are things that the elite group would have to take into consideration. There are two ways in which a leadership group of this sort can be influenced: one is directly, the other is by influencing groups whose opinions, no matter how authoritarian the leadership may be, they cannot totally disregard. I don't think we can assume that no matter how complete a dictatorship is, that its decisions have to take into account the sentiments of the masses. I should think a study of that particular problem well worth undertaking. I think there are probably 50 or 100 projects of that sort.

Benedict: I should like to add to this study not only what Goldhamer has suggested of rebuttals of attacks, but also all kinds of material that goes into the Russian press which they cannot forebear to mention about America. All of those could easily be assimilated to this project or to any other project that we draft. I think that is a very important aspect of our relations that should be made a point of study.

On 3:1a, Cultural Backgrounds of Decision-Making, I'd specify the differences between the two-party system, the veto arrangement of Poland, the individual veto of Russians, and some of the French procedures of arriving at political decisions. The project had read, "the cultural background of methods of political decision making" which is quite different from "personal decisions". It includes the great field of whether you arrive at decisions through allowing every citizen a veto as in Poland in the traditional fashion, or whether you arrive at that two-party decision, how you arrive at it and what backgrounds of these kinds of large decision-making traditions are part of the cultural background, how the study of that makes them intelligible.

Speier: My first reaction was that political decision-making is among other things influenced also by the function of the political institutions in which the decision is being made, and that that perhaps should be given preference to any similarities that may exist in the structure of the family and the structure of a constitutional assembly in these countries. I am afraid that this may easily become a general description of the culture rather than adding to our knowledge of how decisions are made in Poland rather than in the United States. In studying decision-making in Poland, let us say, it seems to me we are interested in the existence of the veto for that case, not in the reasons why it exists. The question of how the institution of this veto is related to other patterns in Polish culture is certainly a very legitimate one, but it seems to me that its intelligence value for understanding decision-making in Poland is relatively small.

Benedict: Take the difference between Holland going to the polls and America going

to the polls. It is a completely different thing which is very difficult to understand without some of the cultural background, which I think can be systematized.

Speier: You are really after an exploration of the dissimilarity of behaviour in similar institutional set-ups. You don't want to study merely the institutional patterns but the actual behaviour regardless of the pattern.

Benedict: It is an institutional pattern -- the form that voting in Holland takes in relation to the decisions that are made in the legislative body. It is an institutional pattern that could not be studied in a formal statement of the rights of citizens to vote in Holland.

Goldhamer: I suspect that often we make very radical misinterpretations of what the policies of a given country are by assuming that certain decisions express the decisionmakers' conception of national interest. Often, when the whole story of how that decision was reached becomes available, we find out, perhaps, that a decision was based simply on some special influence that a particular group was able to bring to bear in order to promote some little interest of its own. By imputing the decision to a theory of national interest we misinterpret completely the significance of the action, which may turn out to be relatively trivial with respect to the total policies of the country. It is not really an expression of some over-all policy. I should think especially that in trying to forewarn ourselves of what is intended by the actions of different countries, we ought to have investigations that would enable us to link the decisions made to internal squabbles within the country, and these are of relatively little international significance -- at least as defining some general policy this country is supposed to pursue.

Shaw: I miss some discussion of the part that Russian misunderstanding of the process of decision-making may play in Russian behavior. The Russians often indicate a great deal of impatience with the round-about processes by which we manage to get the majority decision. Whether that is a significant factor, I have no idea, but it falls within the general problem.

Goldhamer: Project 3:1b, Soviet Selection of Russian Folklore, is a very legitimate proposal for a study of national character. Though it is an extremely difficult task, it strikes me as having decided merit. I don't know quite what would come of it, but at least it places the subject on the basis of a series of special studies. If one could show the coincidence of findings from a series of special studies, approaching the problem of national character from this angle and that angle, with some congruence of results, that might be more satisfactory than setting up some one overall study.

Young: The UNESCO program includes the study of national character as the first item on its agenda, chronologically at least.

Benedict: It has no funds. There is no use relying upon them for anything we want now.

On Project 3:1c, Elite Psychology of Surrender, I feel strongly that the comparative nature of this project should be emphasized. It's not the same to discuss the psychology of face-saving amongst the Italians, Germans and Japanese. It's impossible. And unless this is indicated in the study, it would come out with rather

Benedict: trivial material. The comparative analysis of those three peoples would not throw any light on methods to be used in any surrender of people of another country unless the study attempted to tie up the face-saving problems and the disaster problems to the general patterns of behavior in that nation. There is a very great difficulty in doing it for the Japanese, certainly.

Neumann: I share Mrs. Benedict's objections to this problem, and I would even go beyond them. It is exceedingly doubtful that by analyzing Italian, German and Japanese surrenders, we can come to any conclusion that bears on Soviet terms. I would be extremely loathe to draw any inference from these historical instances to any future, unless a large number of other factors are taken into consideration, much more important than these purely incidental ones.

Ogburn: One of the factors having to do with priorities is the time factor. Most of the projects in this panel have to do with specific countries or specific issues rather than any generalized basic fundamental science. A good many of the studies have a certain immediacy. The problems of diplomatic procedure, understanding the attitudes toward decision-making, etc., are rather urgent right now in dealings with Russia. This dealing with Russia will go on for twenty years; in the course of time we will by mere experience of dealing with them learn a good deal about their ways of doing things, and get accustomed to their folkways. In regard to many of these problems we need to know some of this information relatively soon. If you take that point of view of priority and the point of view of time, then the study of surrender might very well be postponed a little while.

Shaw: Surrender is just one aspect of foreign policy, or in a sense, of diplomatic technique. It would fall within the limits of 3:2a or 3:1a or 3:1. And if it were aligned against the other aspects of those overall subjects, I doubt whether it would have a very high priority.

Andron: A great deal of work on the surrenders of small groups, from a military point of view, was done during the war by OSS and OWI. The material available is quite voluminous, particularly with reference to the type of propaganda appeals that were developed in attempts to meet various situations where small groups or larger armies were surrounded or cut off, to secure surrender with a minimum of bloodshed on both sides. Some study of that material should be quite helpful, even if it were merely to provide a basis for going ahead in the future in another situation. We're all agreed on the points that have been made concerning the necessity of applying any principles concerning surrender to the character structure of the particular people who become the enemy at a future date. We couldn't apply directly the results derived from Japanese experience to, let us say, the Russian group or some other group. On the other hand, I do feel that that material is of some importance. We may be getting into the question raised earlier as to whether it is being done by OSS or some remnant of it. If it is not, what help or suggestions can we offer along those lines? I can mention several very competent people who were spending full time devising surrender appeals. Some benefit out of that work can be secured even if we merely list all the attempts and all the failures -- which might include all the attempts.

Ogburn: I rather like this topic and I would like to see it done this way.

Speier: I take it that you were referring to propaganda on the battle field conducted by military teams or teams attached to the military, rather than to the general question

Speier: of war aims and political warfare -- though such strategic propaganda, of course, set the framework for certain appeals to be made and certain appeals to be ruled out of the other propaganda. For example, in trying to get the German units to surrender you could not tell them that Germany as a nation would not be asked to surrender unconditionally. You could tell them that they would be treated very well in the prison camps, etc. -- which, of course, is more important anyway.

Andron: The range of appeals, as far as the size of the group was concerned, was very great. At one end of the scale, appeals were devised for groups as small as five or six men. At the other end of the scale, such work as that of Captain Zacharias of the Navy was directed against the entire Japanese nation. The appeals were made on several different bases. In the first place, if the propaganda was of the kind we called white propaganda, it had to be within the limits of the nation's express political, economic and military aims. And so we couldn't suggest anything other than unconditional surrender, even if some of us felt that that was not the most happily devised slogan. On the other hand, there was the type called black propaganda, where the techniques were more informal and the possibilities were greater for appeals which could not be used in official propaganda. All of that material should be squeezed dry of its usefulness, even if it's a long series of failures. At least we'll avoid going over the same route again.

Young: With regard to Project 3:2 on Psychological Peacefare, some place in this book it was proposed that we analyze the techniques of the Good Neighbor Policy -- in that case it was in reference to South America and not Russia, where we tried to find the effect of exchanging students, sending distinguished visitors from movie actors to generals, lending money liberally, setting up a general health program, etc. What you have here is the field of techniques for the reduction of group tensions. I'd suggest that it be analyzed, which seems like a very good thing to do.

Shaw: There is also a project having to do with Economic Peacefare, in which the word 'Peacefare' is used differently. Economic devices include such things as blockades, which are hardly on a line with a Good Neighbor policy. I would like to emphasize the ambiguity of the field of action suggested by the term.

Speier: I think we should not bother much about the word 'Peacefare'. In my mind it is a term used to lump together a number of operations which are separate administratively, and also would require entirely different methods of research. On the one hand are the cultural programs, which would include exchange of scholars, teachers and students. There is on the other hand public information, which includes radio and newspaper propaganda. There is thirdly, diplomatic maneuvers, which is a part of the general diplomacy. Why all this is lumped together under the term 'Peacefare' is difficult to understand, except that all these various activities have common objectives. The first two are being studied at the present time in the Brookings Institute. And the content and timing of press releases, together with some aspects of the mass-media foreign propaganda, is, I believe, being studied (as far as the State Department and other Government agencies are concerned), by the Council of Foreign Relations. In both cases the studies are being undertaken by very competent people. The only thing that remains uncovered seems to be diplomatic maneuvers. And I suggest that that is either too little or so broad that it would have to be broken down a little further. I would propose that this whole Project be dismissed.

Goldhamer: I will second that motion.

Young: The effectiveness of these various devices such as cultural exchange of students, different types of public issues for South America, Russia and other countries has not been tested, and I doubt very much whether it is being tested under the Brookings or the Council of Foreign Relations program, although I have not seen the details of either. I'm talking now of testing it in the experimental sense rather than in the evaluative historical sense, and I would very much like to see that kind of planning done.

Speier: The study by the Council of Foreign Relations is based on an investigation of the reports from the target areas by State Department officials. You have reports on how many people visited the movie theaters, on how many radio receiving sets are used in this country, and you have for certain areas even listening surveys, but you do not have anything like a very reliable tracer of the effectiveness of the various methods; and you have a considerable amount of uncertainty and lack of clarity on the part of the State Department official as to which particular approach is most effective -- e.g., the use of a medium which would attempt to reach large parts of the population, or the use of means to influence opinion makers in the target area, say by personal contact with newspapermen. There is no basic philosophy in the Department of State as to which method is more effective.

Young: We are bringing in and sending out thousands of students right now, our own and Europeans. We assume that just to bring them here and send them to Michigan, Harvard, etc., will somehow increase rapport, and reduce dangers of misunderstandings. We don't know whether that works or not. It is true that there is at least one study of that going on at the present time in the Midwest on a rather hand-to-mouth financial basis. But an experiment could be set up to see under what conditions foreign students coming over here get one attitude or another.

Stouffer: There is a possibility of this whole business having a kick-back which might very well be studied, at least superficially. There was some talk of bringing a number of Russian scholars to the United States. An argument could be made that those men would lose all their effectiveness when they got back, because they would be forever after suspect. The only way that they could probably behave effectively would be to lean over backwards in attacking the United States, whatever their private attitudes. One check on that sort of thing would be to take German and Japanese students who were beneficiaries of Rockefeller Scholarships, etc., and try to find out what kind of positions and attitudes they held during the late conflict.

Young: There is a general assumption that if you understand the culture of another country, you will love it. I rather doubt it. That particular philosophy is basic to the UNESCO program.

Goldhamer: It would be necessary not only to know what attitudes these people developed as a result of their stay in the country, but also, what is more important for present purposes, whether those attitudes are in any way disseminated. These people might develop very affirmative or negative attitudes but they might have relatively little effect on their associates.

Speier: There are some studies which could be drawn into this sort of investigation. There are, for example, further studies on the behavior of German prisoners of war

Speier: in this country who went through army orienta courses.

Young: We recommend to RAND that they get somebody to plan experimental studies of specific problems such as the one that Stouffer was recommending, the one with PW's, for example, student exchanges, etc. We pass from that to 3:2b, The Effect of Positive and Passive Behavior on U.S. - Russian Relations.

Benedict: They'll have to distinguish what is passive and what is active behavior in the eyes of the Russians, not necessarily in our eyes. It is very difficult to distinguish the reaction to active and passive behavior when no one may be able to agree what is active or passive.

Young: This idea of passive behavior, or decisive as against indecisive behavior by policy makers, is a technique of diplomacy, is it not?

Goldhamer: Perhaps the problem raised by this project is whether it's better to stick to a stubborn policy even though conditions change. One might make a generalized statement, at least with respect to particular elites, as to how they react to fluctuations in policies of the countries with which they deal. One might decide that beyond a certain minimal degree of fluctuation it is not desirable to alter your alignments.

Young: Bullheadedness against appeasement, is the phrase. Isn't it?

Benedict: Might the problem include the United States Senate not meeting until January? That is passive in the eyes of Pravda articles about Americans.

Speier: Is anything meant in this distinction between positive and passive, other than fast and slow, tough and soft, stubborn and appeasing?

Young: Nobody so far has spoken in favor of developing this idea; we give it a very low priority.

Shaw: Somewhere underneath it there's a germ of an idea, but we haven't been able to discover that germ.

Benedict: On 3:2c, U.S. and Russian Usage of Political Terms, the understanding of the meaning of these terms has a large variance in different countries. A mere content analysis of the pronouncements is by no means sufficient, without a good deal of cultural understanding of the basis on which these terms occur in general usage.

Young: Would you suggest that a dictionary or encyclopedia of the political and diplomatic terms would be useful if it were based not only on content analysis of pronouncements of publications, but also on an analysis of the culture?

Benedict: I feel very strongly that this would be a very valuable thing, but it works out to be more of an encyclopedia than a dictionary.

Young: I've discussed this problem with Dr. Herring and General Osborn, and their dealings with the Russians on the Atomic Energy Commission. They were always bringing

Young: in the fact that the words didn't mean the same, that there was no way of translating.

Neumann: I don't think it would be a good idea to do it in the form of a dictionary. There is an article by Rudolph Fathinger (?), the English sociologist, on the different meanings of the term 'democracy', which is a model of analysis of the meaning of the same term in two different societies.

Speier: A good content analysis would have to take into account these differences of political ideology in any case, otherwise it just wouldn't be an analysis. If you really analyze the content of the pronouncement, you'll have to use all available methods to get a good analysis.

Stouffer: Suppose you were to try to write up the difference between the meaning of the word 'democracy' as used in South Carolina and as used in Vermont. You would get into all kinds of very complex problems. You would be dealing with pronouncements in terms of behavior, which might be different with different groups in different situations. Before you got through with any attempt at clarification, you would pretty nearly be writing a history and analysis of all American culture. I doubt very much whether a person can write an essay of ten pages which would clearly delineate the differences of the meaning of the word 'democracy' in Vermont and South Carolina -- an essay that would be intelligible to people who didn't have the entire background that was necessary for interpreting.

Benedict: Neumann's suggestion of the English article is excellent. It's an excellent model.

Stouffer: If you're going to do anything like this, a fairly limited number of concepts should be chosen, and those should be more or less interpreted in terms of the whole background.

Benedict: The problem is, when you get to work with one term the other term falls in two. It's very hard to lay out your definition of the problem by the exact number of words which you will discuss.

Speier: I think it is a useful project. One could easily enlarge it by including a study of problems like this: to what extent is deliberate use being made of ambiguous terms? To what extent are the same terms used in different meanings in addressing different audiences, etc.? But these questions could be answered only after the basic question raised in this project has been satisfactorily answered.

Stouffer: If we consider this worth doing, perhaps even more important is: what does it mean to somebody in Yugoslavia, say, when the Russians and the United States use the word 'freedom'? What does it mean in certain of the crucial borderline areas of the world? You get into a fantastically large project, but that would make more sense in many ways then just to deal with a comparison between Russia and the United States. But I don't feel very strongly about this project.

Ogburn: In so far as the problems discussed concerned Russia or ways of dealing with Russia, there ought to be in the background some notion of Russia's interest or Russia's power. A general project would be in order on the relationship of

Ogburn: strategy to objectives. Any one of these projects would be of merit only in so far as it took into consideration the objectives and the power concerned. One of the things that is very interesting right now in regard to Russia is the question of whether Russian interests are concerned with the legacy of the Czar or the legacy of Karl Marx -- in other words, the question of whether Russian interests are of a nationalistic sort or whether they are of a class or ideological nature. That is a topic which is leading to a great division of opinion in western Europe and the United States at the present time. You will find very large numbers of people in the United States today who conceive of Russian objectives as ideological, i.e., to spread the doctrine of Karl Marx, and view that as an objective which is associated with very great intensity, very great power. On the other hand, Walter Lippman would say that Russian aims are nationalistic. The policies which one takes toward Russia are conditioned a great deal by how we see these aims. One problem that would be very interesting to study in this connection would be the relation of ideology to practices. There are many cases where ideologies are simply subjects to which lip-service is paid, and there are other people with whom ideologies are viewed with a passion that is like that of a zealot. The question right now is: do the Russians in general follow their ideology with great passion or is it a ritual? That would be a project of first rate importance. The perfect solution of the manners involved in diplomacy may not get you anywhere. If we understood the way the Russians use the word 'democracy' and if we understood the way the folklore worked on their decisions, then the question of Russian influence in Iran would still not be solved, and no amount of understanding of Russian manners is going to clear up that particular issue. That again shows how the idea of objectives and power must always be related to these manners and techniques. To sum up: two views might be considered here -- one is a general study of the relation of techniques to objectives, strategy to power; and the other would be the general study of the relation of ideology to action.

Shaw: There would be some purpose in extending that to a study of the blocs that follow the Russian line in other countries -- those in Communist groups, the French Communist group, the Italian one -- they find quite different basic motivations in each of those cases, even though the superficial phenomena are the same. It might be very instructive to look at some of those cases.

Ogburn: My guess would be that the French Communists are not very much Communists; they are really interested in other things.

Benedict: The Greek Communists would be a highly interesting subject in this connection.

Young: I will try quickly to review. We began by saying that the field of this Panel might be considered to be included under political psychology, but was rather better described by a phrase of how leaders operate. We added to that that we would have to take into account the interests represented by those leaders or by the groups to which they belonged; and we included under the term 'leaders' not only political leaders, but industrial leaders, intellectual leaders, and any other kinds of elite. The first project on political apathy we questioned in terms of the adequacy of the term "apathy"; it should be expanded to get greater coverage in the direction of political participation, bringing in such concepts as rejection, identification, collaboration, etc., paying attention to the degree of enthusiasm in participation. On project 3:1, Psychology of Russian Policy, it was pointed out that that was not

Young: really possible, and that what we were concerned with was the psychology of Russian decision-making affecting foreign policy; and we thought the Conference report suggestions as to the basic materials were totally inadequate. Project 3:1b, Soviet Selection of Russian Folklore, was regarded by the Panel as a proposal for the development of a technique in gaining understanding of national character which deserved further exploration. Project 3:1c, Elite Psychology of Surrender, was given a low priority for a variety of reasons. On Project 3:2, Psychological Peacefare, it was suggested that even though considerable study is now under way covering the area described under this project (particularly the work at Brookings and the Council on Foreign Relations), there was still room for planning of specific experiments on the various techniques used to develop international understanding and cooperation. Particular reference was made to exchange of students, publications,etc. Project 3:2b, Effect of Positive and Passive Behaviour on U.S. -- Russian Relations, was not recommended for favorable consideration. Project 3:2c, U.S. and Russian Usage of Political Terms, received favorable consideration with the suggestion that special care should be taken to relate the materials obtained from Conference records and pronouncements, publications, etc.,to the culture of the country. Ogburn pointed out the necessity for paying attention to the goals of Russia; someone else suggested neighboring countries as well, and suggested that it was particularly important that we encourage studies attempting to relate ideology to actual practice.

COMMITTEE I
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

W.F. Ogburn (Chairman)

R. Benedict	E. Kris
B. Berelson	H.D. Lasswell
H. Goldhamer	F. Mosteller
C.L. Hull	H. Speier

Lasswell: I am not sure whether one type of project which I think is very fruitful for the technical people to consider has been considered in much detail. That is the possible use of the voice as the instrument of getting results -- an examination of the different predispositions with respect to voice patterns that prevail in the various situations in the social structure of countries that one wishes to influence. I do not see here a definite project which recommends we summarize our present knowledge of the effect of terror as a political instrument. A great deal of relevant material of a comparative sort is available, and experimental approaches to this problem are feasible. On the study of voice as an instrument for control, there are large possibilities for investigating in a systematic way the predispositions to respond to various vocal patterns either with an acceptance of the probability that the person who is talking is telling the truth, or the response to a voice with fanatic response of confusion and uncertainty, etc., through a list of various responses. The analysis of voice also includes a systematic investigation of what can be learned, for intelligence purposes, by examining the voices of enemy leaders, representative persons in enemy groups, and even in potential allied groups, etc. In the panel concerned with intelligence, a project was mentioned in which the line of recommendation was that we explore the possibilities for intelligence purposes of making use of hypnosis and drugs by which enemy agents could be reeducated, made amnesic to the experiments, and returned to their native land to carry on on the basis of the new education. This is only one small, untried possibility in the field that I feel requires systematic coverage in two directions. (1) The entire range of possibilities in the field of hypnosis and drug-induced states of receptivity. (2) The possibility of their use, not with specific individuals one at a time, but with aggregates of individuals at the same time. I have in mind the implications of such use for disaster relief and control; the possibility of the quick selection of the kinds of agents, therapeutic agents, drug agents, etc., which could be made use of in time of crisis.

Hull: The projects selected should be of the sort that fit into each other so that they add up to something.

Mosteller: The following suggestions are principally those of Viner, written up by me, and not corrected by him. "Future Steps in the Organization of Social Science to Assist RAND" -- "We feel the ideas below should be carefully criticized by others before being implemented. When the present Conference is over RAND should take the

Mosteller: following steps: (1) Transcribe the records into some workable and readable form, deleting the material which is out of order and improving on the grammar, punctuation, etc. (2) Call a second conference of operators who know the problems and areas of the many disciplines involved. It is envisaged that there would be approximately ten men. These men would get together for one or two weeks to rework the conference material. It is their job to prepare the next step. Their work would culminate in extended statements about the problem, stating what ideas gave rise to the problem, what was needed for RAND, and suggesting the people who could design and people who could do the job. (3a) In some cases this next step would be to ask someone to write an idea or an analytical essay on the subject that should be criticized by others. This essay is to help RAND see where the real gaps are, what information is available for the asking, and what serious research projects need to be set up. (3b) In other cases the next step would be to submit to research designers the problems phrased by the ten man group. (4) When designs for projects have been drafted the time has come to choose people to carry out the research problems. These men will consider the over-all designs and organize their projects to carry out those parts which are appropriate. They will also indicate something about the time, staff, finances, etc., needed to carry out the work. (5) Parallel with this previous operation, RAND will require a central agency to coordinate the work, save duplication of effort, and act as a clearing house. This central organization will need to maintain a constant vigil to see that the work is adding up to something. This central agency with expert advice must appoint critical reviewing committees to review periodically and frequently the value and progress of results of the projects. These committees will make recommendations about the disposition of specific projects."

Berelson: What is meant by 'operators' in the second group, which is to meet on the results of this problem? Are they people in government agencies who have to deal with these problems?

Mosteller: They need to be men in the field who know the problems, who know the people; and know the problems not only on the top level, but also specifically at the detailed level, so that they can really recognize what the problem is, with respect to an area of research or to a research project. I would not expect them necessarily to be in government. I expect you would find those people all over the place, and there aren't very many of them running around either. In other words, these are people who are going to consider the next lower level from where we stand.

Ogburn: I would question the advisability of having these ten operators meet before we get into the definition of an operator. I would assume an operator is a person who has his hands in the dirt of research and knows how to do it. But it seems to me that before you called together such a group of ten operators there ought to be a good deal of work done by some sort of staff attached to RAND by way of preparation for a meeting of this kind. You could get a flexible, hard-working group attached to RAND, and could make a general use of advisors either in the form of consultants or committees. It's quite possible that if you had set up a sort of staff that could assimilate or pick ideas rather quickly you could get a lot from these advisors, not only with regard to the subject, but also with regard to the personnel. After you did that you might be in a better position to think about another super-conference of some kind, of super-intellects. The topics which this conference would deal with are likely to be highly diverse. They might all be pointed up to the objectives that

Ogburn: have been stated with reference to this conference (having to do with the status and strength of our nation); still, from the point of view of research and technique, they would be highly diverse. I have a healthy respect for an opinion passed by someone who is familiar with the field of the project, and I've also seen some rather bad opinions come from very able people who were not familiar with the the subject matter. I'm not at all sure that it would be necessary and desirable for these ten individuals to have specific knowledge.

Mosteller: Viner's thought was that those ten people are supposed to be experts in specific fields, as Ogburn suggests, and that they take the transcriptions that we have and begin to try to build specific enough questions so that the designer might have some hope of stepping in and writing a specific project.

Kris: Some organization must sift the work of this conference. While this organization will have to make the final selection, it seems to be in order to point to one criterion for selection which I believe has been badly neglected. This criterion is the disappearance of data. Very much of what the projects I have heard discussed on three panels envisage, is not research in the sense of finding a new proposition, but rather, verifying a proposition by what one might simply call coordination of information. I would much rather have the word "intelligence" used than the word research, but obviously the word is about to change it's meaning. It doesn't mean any more only the search for new truths or the establishments of old truths. It is also used in the newspapers' sense to refer to the "background story." With due respect to many of the projects, they are compilations of existing information from hidden sources. This should be clearly distinguished from some of the work which tries to establish new insights of any kind. I'd like to point to various areas where the data which we need for purposes of information are disappearing. In many areas where experience of the last war is concerned this is happening rapidly. During one of the discussions where a set-up for operational research was in question, it was pointed out that if people who worked in operational research were asked how that research was done, they are already now likely to present a somewhat idealized and glorified picture, and we won't really uncover new information. We may have lost some of the really hard and minute facts which would help us to organize operational research very largely on a country-wide scale, with a revised scientific method. This morning another aspect was mentioned which I have mentioned at one or two previous occasions -- the reaction of human beings to terror situations of extreme deprivation. I refer specifically to persons who have been exposed to totalitarian practices of cruelty; the data is vanishing. When we now want to establish an exact record of the experience of long-term inmates of concentration camps, and when we try to establish that by a differentiated interview method, what we would get now, about two and a half years after concentration-camp experience, is only resentment. The impact of the immediate experience, which one might be after as a social scientist, whether from the sociological or psychological side, is already being lost. Psychologists would find themselves in a somewhat more difficult situation. I would very much stress that as social scientists we may have the right to stress one aspect of project selection: namely, not that of urgency from the point of view of the policy makers who desire information, but from the point of view of the data that I have described. Somebody should make such a recommendation very explicitly, because I think in many cases it is a matter of serious concern.

Goldhamer: In the second meeting of Panel 1 and Panel 2 together, some of the

Goldhamer: projects underwent considerable reevaluation. Opinion was changed, in many respects quite radically, as to how valuable the project would be. This suggested to me that one must not take too seriously the evaluations that have been reached at this particular stage. They are very important, but it indicates that under continuing discussion and analysis, especially if these projects get formulated closer to a research design, these changes may take place right along the line. Consequently, we don't need to worry about the evaluations made here being absolute, definitive, or final.

Berelson: There might be one useful criterion in the selection of projects. If a group of people who are concerned with the utilization of the kinds of research results which members of this panel envisage could meet on the basis of a systematic outline, a new book of projects would come out of this Conference. I suggest that as only one criterion of selection.

Speier: There are a number of projects which can be undertaken without access to records or personnel that are difficult to get at, particularly in government agencies. There are quite a number of other projects, however, which in various panels were regarded as fairly important, and which could not be undertaken without the cooperation of a number of government agencies -- either by making available the records, or by opening channels for RAND at large, or anybody who works with RAND, which would enable the person to interview government personnel or look into certain government procedures (for example, the question of coordination of intelligence). It is not possible to walk into various government agencies. For example, any question of the study of morale policies during the second World War, would require that somebody who worked for RAND, either directly or indirectly, have access to certain materials which are now controlled by the British. Somewhere along the line considerable attention should be paid to this problem of clearance of material and access to persons who are otherwise difficult to approach. If this is not done, and well done, on that fairly high level, very many of the projects will very seriously suffer in their execution or cannot be undertaken at all, despite the fact that as far as their content is concerned many experts would be inclined to attribute high priorities to them.

Ogburn: Many of the studies of Panel 1, on Morale and Aggression, are in the nature of specific measurement studies having to do with group behavior or psychological behavior; whereas there are a good many problems having to do with aggression which might be approached from what I might call the cultural point of view. It's possible, for instance, that if the American people have not suffered very much in a war (relative to what other countries have), and if they have been victorious in those wars, and if there has been money made during the wars, their attitude toward aggression or entering another war would be one thing. On the other hand, if you have a country that has been overridden and destroyed and to which the "scorched earth" policy has been applied, you might find that willingness to become aggressive would be something else again. Studies of certain broader cultural situations may not be technically of a research nature or a scientific nature yet are rather important in this way. I had this experience when I was visiting the state of Texas this spring. I wondered why it was that those Texans are so "aggressive," but when I saw what's happening down there in regard to oil, and in regard to natural gas, and in regard to the chemical industry; and when I saw my neighbors getting rich overnight more or less, I could see that there would be a certain optimism arising

Ogburn: in a situation of that kind. It wasn't difficult also to see how, with ego being what it is, there was a certain confidence in those Texans. And I got the idea that any sort of relatively quick acquisition of wealth or improvement in one's economic status might lead to a certain aggressiveness. I was also moved to think that there are national illustrations (rather than states), and the most interesting one I can think of, at least as an idea or theory, was that when you move from an agricultural or household economy into the industrial revolution or power economy based upon the mechanical power of mass production, you have something analogous to the Texas situation. That is, people oftentimes have a way of making money and getting rich. You will find that certain nations, when they make this transition, develop this confidence and optimism. We don't call it aggressive desire, we call it aggression. I suspect that the readiness of Japan and Germany to go to war might be based upon some such factor as this. It may very well be that, when certain other big countries which occupy one-sixth of the territory of the world develop an industrial revolution in a big way, they may also have certain attitudes of aggression. These are not so much psychological studies as they are border ideas which, however, relate to attitudes toward war and aggression. They might be tossed in as part of the scope of this general picture.

The whole phenomenon of propaganda hasn't been developed in this Panel as one might have thought.

Goldhamer: Considerable systematic expansion of what was discussed that might be related to propaganda is highly desirable. If, following Berelson's suggestion, the project book were to be rewritten, that certainly would be one definite line in which a rewrite or expansion might be made.

Berelson: I haven't heard any explicit attention in these panels given to the problems of studying inter-group relations of various sorts within this country. I am thinking of two kinds of studies particularly: (1) Relations involving various minority groups, race relations and religious group relations, and (2) The area of labor relations; human relations in industry or employee-employer relations, etc. The relevance of these areas to the topics of Panel 1 and 2 is obvious; although they may be implicitly contained, the record ought to have them explicitly.

Hull: Stouffer's proposal on the improvement of measurement in Social psychology (Project 2:10) should be stressed. I feel it is a very important thing.

Speier: Under utility of results it is said that the usefulness of Project 2:1b (Pro-Russian Feeling in U.S.) (as rewritten) would largely consist in providing information on the targets for counter-propaganda, if it is desired to redirect the political sympathies of the individuals and groups in question. The study is meant to be focused, I take it, on pro-Russian sympathies. I think that the person who redrafted it was really after finding out critical attitudes toward the official U.S. government position, which is not necessarily pro-Russian. If we assume for the purpose of the discussion the war-time need of counteracting Russian propaganda, particularly in groups critically disposed toward the American government, we should not limit it merely to a study of pro-Russian feelings in the population. We should consider critical opinions of our foreign policy as they are held by certain parts of the population at large, whether or not they are associated with pro-Russian feelings. I would very definitely suggest that if this project is considered to be worthwhile, this enlarged area should be exploited rather than the narrowly defined

Speier: area.

Kris: I have certain doubts whether at present a sample of all critical attitudes would be as profitable to investigate as a restricted sample, but I thought it was discussed in the Committee that all extremist views should be considered, and that it was then found that for the purposes of operation it might be profitable to limit the area.

I have the following feeling about Hull's remarks on the desirability of improving measurement (Project 2:10), if I may go back to the confusion about what research means. As scientists we participate in a solution of emergency problems, but there is a somewhat divided belief that our interest still belongs to finding new areas. Sometimes science may profit from the emergency, and not only the emergency from science. Since we do not exactly know how time elements affect all our planning, any improvement of measurement of social psychology may mean a considerable advance in any future situation in which research must operate in an emergency. Even small gains may be worth a good deal later from the point of view of policymakers. Surely the interest of the social scientists is in considering improvement of measurement as well as the very vital areas of future development. From the point of view of a coordination of interests, improvement of measurement is probably one of those problems where most social scientists are likely to be able to coordinate some of their attempts, many of their failures, and perhaps a few of their achievements. I would say that this should surely gain a high priority.

Ogburn: On Project 2:11, Formation of Opinion on Public Issues, in many countries we have a way of measuring opinion by taking every 21st house in a certain block and canvassing the opinion of the people in that house. But of course, there are other sources of opinion -- the opinion of the elite or the opinion of experts. In any properly developed intelligence service of a country there should be some attention given to opinion from either expert sources or power sources, as contrasted to merely recording the opinion by polls taken as samples of the underlying population.

Goldhamer: The possibility of utilizing handwriting analysis should not be overlooked, especially in circumstances where it is desirable to have some conception of an individual -- when one has absolutely no other source or access to that individual. Some of the studies that recently have been made at Harvard, and some others, indicate that there is knowledge that can be gained from handwriting analysis -- especially, as I say, in circumstances where no other information at all about the individual is available.

Kris: I would question that. For twenty-five years I have assembled a large number of data which interpret expressive movements of one kind or another. If you ask very general questions, then you get a probability of many interpretations -- somewhere around 70 to 80% of the answers, depending on what judge you use, and how you interpret, and how well you know the context. But the ambiguity is such that the specific investigation you want to make, related to character-structure and decision-making, would not be served. The data about it, in general, would not throw any light on how that person would behave in a concrete political situation. The more concrete the question you ask, the more detailed are the data you get about behaviour. The questions are very misleading, and I point to the fact that

Kris: procedures such as suggested by the rewrite of project 1:2a are much more reliable, because here you use a very large number of behaviour patterns which you study in great detail. I remain skeptical whether you will be able to make forecasts on the behaviour of individuals; you may, however, make successful forecasts on the training principle of an operating elite.

Benedict: Handwriting as a projective test falls in the same category with all projective tests in the study of national character. It is one of the projective tests that always has to be used against the cultural base, the handwriting of that nation, of that class; and without that it is impossible to interpret. Therefore it is subsumed in a larger study of national character.

Goldhamer: That is generally taken for granted. I think the data justifies that if you know nothing about an individual you probably are better off by using such marginal techniques then by not using anything at all.

Ogburn: To consider opinion-making or policy-making without referring to the major interests of a nation is likely to be highly restricted. Even if you had exactly the same manners and exactly the same technique of bargaining, you would still have conflicting interests in northern Persia, let us say, or around the Dardanelles. I believe that in any working out of projects of this kind, these manners or behaviours or processes should be always seen in connection with the background of national interests.

A surprising number of these projects arise because there is a technique involved in handling them. We have picked up the technique of measuring group relationships, and it is as though you project into a situation a given technique and then see what you can do to illustrate it. This is somewhat different, of course, from the approach which we have used in the other panels, but if RAND were pursuing the field of Committee I, they would find it may be worthwhile to see what sociological and psychological studies are not particularly tied to these mechanisms or procedural aspects. For instance, I am very much impressed with the necessity of preparing for war in peacetime. Now that is very difficult because of the psychological attitudes, prejudices, and feelings of the people. There are many, many resistances to overcome in trying to be on a war status in peacetime, and you can see at once how a proposal to disperse the population or move the factories, say, would meet resistance on the part of the taxpayers of a community or the Chamber of Commerce or certain groups of this kind. If you select on the basis of subject matter related to war or preparation for war, there are undoubtedly questions that would turn up a different set of psychological problems which wouldn't turn up if you focus a good deal upon particular techniques of measurement.